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A B ST R AC T. Devised in the aftermath of the most severe financial crisis since the Great De-
pression, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) was
enacted to reduce risk, increase transparency, and promote market integrity. Since Dodd-Frank
was signed into law in 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodi-
ty Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) have promulgated numerous rules to carry out these
statutory mandates. This Note analyzes inconsistencies in the two Commissions' swaps regula-
tions and argues that those inconsistencies have forced regulators and market participants to bear
substantial costs and, more importantly, have thwarted the congressional goals underlying
Dodd-Frank. To this day, neither the SEC nor the CFTC has offered an adequate justification for
its decision not to harmonize swaps rules.
In this Note, I argue that the Commissions' failure to account for these costs constitutes an
illegal exercise of authority. The crux of my argument is that the Commissions cannot perform
meaningful cost-benefit analysis or fulfill the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) reason-
giving requirements without considering the incremental costs generated by regulatory incon-
sistencies. I conclude that when the SEC and CFTC fail to justify the costs of regulatory diver-
gences, both the APA and the cost-benefit requirements in the agencies' authorizing statutes
can-and should-be read to require the Commissions to adjust their rules to account for the
costs of inconsistent and duplicative swaps regulations.
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INTRODUCTION
In early April 2012, just two years after Congress passed the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),' a sense of
ddjh vu paralyzed financial markets. On April 6, the press reported that J.P.
Morgan had suffered significant losses because of trades executed in its London
office.2 A week later, CEO Jamie Dimon dismissed these reports as a mere
"tempest in a teapot."' But the loss turned out to be more than that. One
month later, J.P. Morgan disclosed that its losses had ballooned from $415 mil-
lion to $2 billion.' By the end of the year, transactions executed by a single J.P.
Morgan trader named Bruno Iksill -more commonly known as the "London
Whale"-led to a $6.2 billion trading loss.' In other words, barely two years
after the most consequential financial regulatory reform in decades, a major fi-
nancial institution took risky bets that once again roiled global credit markets.
And - even more troubling - it did so right under the nose of its regulators.
A year-long Senate investigation followed. The investigation concluded
that the American financial system would be less vulnerable to systemic shocks
if federal regulators required more comprehensive financial reporting,6 used
more accurate risk models,' and finalized rules prohibiting banks from using
1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
2. See, e.g., Gregory Zuckerman & Katy Burne, "London Whale" Rattles Debt Market, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBlooo1424o527023032996045773260311
19412436 [http://perma.cc/HEH5-LE2Y]. See generally STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM.
ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF
DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES 3-13 (Comm. Print 2013) (providing an overview of the J.P.
Morgan case).
3. STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at lo-11.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 35; Katy Burne, Making Waves Against "Whale," WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424o527023o4587704577336130953863286 [http://
perma.cc/XSK8-U7EG]; Christopher Matthews, Too Big To Fail: 3 Lessons of the "London
Whale" Debacle, TIME (Mar. 20, 2013), http://business.time.com/2o13/o3/2o/what-have-we
-learned-3-lessons-from-the-london-whale-trading-debacle [http://perma.cc/8FZY-7CJ9].
6. STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 16 ("Federal regula-
tors should require banks to identify all internal investment portfolios containing derivatives
over a specified notional size, and require periodic reports with detailed performance data
for those portfolios. . . . Federal regulators should require banks to establish hedging poli-
cies and procedures that mandate detailed documentation when establishing a hedge, in-
cluding identifying the assets being hedged, how the hedge lowers the risk associated with
those assets, how and when the hedge will be tested for effectiveness, and how the hedge
will be unwound and by whom.").




money held in federally insured deposit accounts to make speculative invest-
ments that did not benefit their customers.'
The usefulness of the Senate Report, however, was undermined by the fact
that existing regulations rendered many of its recommendations superfluous.
Dodd-Frank already required that data on swaps,' the financial instruments
traded by the London Whale,10 be reported on publicly accessible exchanges."
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), one of the agencies
charged with monitoring swaps and detecting destabilizing financial positions,
had finalized swap-reporting rules in March 2012. Those rules went into effect
at the beginning of 2013.12
Nor did the Report mention that banks had already begun to report swap
data in anticipation of the CFTC's rules. In the aftermath of the London Whale
8. Id. at 17 ("Federal financial regulators should immediately issue a final rule implementing
the Merkley-Levin provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act, also known as the Volcker Rule, to stop high risk proprietary trading activities and
the build-up of high risk assets at federally insured banks and their affiliates."). Note that it
is unclear if the Volcker Rule would have prevented the London Whale trades. The line be-
tween proprietary trading, which would be barred under the Volcker Rule, and hedging,
which would be permitted, is thin. In the London Whale case, the Senate Report assumes
that the trades would be considered proprietary trading. J.P. Morgan, by contrast, claims
that the bank was hedging, intending to reduce losses in a downturn. Compare id. at 14 ("In-
ternal bank documents revealed that the [credit portfolio] was not managed as a hedge and,
by March 2012, was not providing credit loss protection to the bank."), with id. at 4
("JPMorgan Chase told the Subcommittee that the [credit portfolio] was not intended to
function as a proprietary trading desk, but as insurance or a 'hedge' against credit risks con-
fronting the bank.").
9. A "swap" is a contract that requires conditional payments between counterparties derived
from changes in specified prices or events, generally related to financial markets, such as in-
terest or currency exchange rates. "Swaps" can also include "credit" events, such as the de-
fault by a borrower on an unrelated "reference" security or loan. For example, parties can
trade (or swap) the cash flows from one financial instrument, such as the interest payments
on a corporate bond, for the cash flows from another financial instrument, such as the prin-
cipal and variable rate payment on a mortgage-backed security. See Product Descriptions and
Frequently Asked Questions, INT'L SwAPs & DERIVATIVES AsS'N, http://www.isda.org/educat
/faqs.html [http://perma.cc/9QIGM-DKLE].
10. STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 29; see also Eleazar
David Melindez, How Did JPMorgan Lose Billions in One Trade? London 'Whale' Explained,
INT'L Bus. TIMES (May 5, 2012), http://www.ibtimes.com/how-did-jpmorgan-lose-billions
-one-trade-london-whale-explained-69q8o18 [http://perma.cc/6KRE-M7EM].
ii. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 721, 761, 124 Stat. 1376, 1658-72, 1754-59 (2010) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 8302).
12. Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 1182 (Jan. 9, 2012)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. Pt. 43); Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements, 77
Fed. Reg. 2136 (Jan. 13, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. Pt. 45).
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incident, Michael Bodson, the chief executive of a company that collected swap
data, acknowledged that data on the London Whale's trades had been reported
to swap data repositories." The problem was that although CFTC rules specify
what data must be reported, the rules do not explain how data repositories
should report information.14 According to Bodson, regulators failed to detect
the London Whale's position not because the data was unavailable, but because
formatting incompatibilities rendered it unusable."
Significantly, however, Title VII of Dodd-Frank does not grant regulatory
authority over swaps solely to the CFTC, but divides oversight between the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the CFTC. 16 Title VII grants the
SEC the authority to regulate security-based swaps and the CFTC the authori-
ty to regulate all other swaps." In accordance with its own statutory mandate,
the SEC issued its final rule on the reporting and public dissemination of secu-
rity-based swap information over three years after the CFTC's rules went into
effect. " Dodd-Frank split oversight between the two agencies in order to avoid
alienating members of Congress who served on the agricultural committees, 9
who had made it clear that they would vote against any bill that removed the
CFTC from their jurisdiction.2 0
13. Joe Rennison, Policymakers Left with Problem in the Wake of London Whale: US Derivatives
Regulator Admitted It Missed the Calamity, FIN. TIMEs (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.ft.com
/content/ 7 b 5e4c2-638c-11e 5 -9846-de4o6ccb3 7 f2 [http://perma.cc/W4LT-4TRY].
14. See, e.g., Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. at 2198-2210;
see also infra Part I.
15. See Rennison, supra note 1;.
16. See §§ 721, 761, 124 Stat. at 1658-72, 1754-59 (2010).
17. See id. As discussed in Part I, there is no principled reason why either agency regulates the
swaps under its jurisdiction. Although the word "security" in security-based swaps may give
the impression that the SEC has special expertise in the swaps under its jurisdiction, this
simply is not the case. All swaps are derivatives, and the only difference between swaps un-
der the SEC's jurisdiction and swaps under the CFTC's jurisdiction is how many securities
the swap is based on. In fact, the same small number of financial institutions are parties to
the vast majority of swaps under both agencies' jurisdictions, and the swaps themselves,
whether regulated by the SEC or the CFTC, work in exactly the same way -they are simply
agreements to exchange (or swap) cash flows.
18. Regulation SBSR- Reporting and Dissemination of Security-Based Swap Information, So
Fed. Reg. 14,564 (Mar. 19, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
ig. See Jim Puzzanghera, CFTC's Farm Roots Complicate Reform Efforts, L.A. TIMEs (Sept.
8, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/o8/business/fi-financial-reform8 [http://
perma.cc/5EPG-NESZ].




In abandoning regulatory consolidation, Title VII permitted the SEC and
CFTC to create a fragmented reporting regime that has raised the costs of
complying with Dodd-Frank while making it more difficult for regulators to
supervise the swaps market. There is no question that the SEC and CFTC are
each statutorily required to issue swaps regulations.2 1 Nonetheless, the effec-
tiveness of the SEC's and CFTC's rules depends in large part on whether their
rules are compatible.22 This Note analyzes recent D.C. Circuit cost-benefit cases
in order to argue that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the cost-
benefit mandates in the agencies' organic statutes, both individually and in
tandem, require that the SEC and CFTC either justify the costs of regulatory
inconsistencies or harmonize their regulations. Thus, in addition to offering a
possible solution to the SEC's and CFTC's unwillingness to promulgate con-
sistent swaps rules, this Note offers a new, albeit limited, defense of cost-
benefit analysis. Recently, a number of academics have criticized "judicially re-
viewed, quantified"23 cost-benefit requirements as an exercise in futility and a
judicially sanctioned attempt to quantify the unquantifiable.2 4 By forcing agen-
cies to harmonize their rules when they cannot offer a reasonable justification
for an inconsistency, I show that cost-benefit requirements can discipline agen-
cy action in cases involving overlapping agency jurisdiction.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief overview of Dodd-
Frank and examines existing rules governing swap reporting and swap execu-
tion facilities (SEFs). This Part shows that the SEC's and CFTC's failure to col-
laborate has created unnecessary costs, made the American financial system less
transparent, and introduced unjustified risk into the market. Part II analyzes
the cost-benefit and APA requirements that govern SEC and CFTC rule-
makings. I argue that the two agencies are legally required to consider how
their swaps regulations interact. Although practitioners and scholars have ar-
gued that it is desirable for the two agencies to collaborate,2 5 almost no one has
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 8302(a) (2012).
22. As discussed in detail in Part I, compatibility between the two agencies' rules will decrease
the costs of complying with swaps rules and make Dodd-Frank more effective. Data incom-
patibilities have forced market participants to build two different reporting infrastructures
and make it impossible for regulators to analyze the entire swaps market.
23. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Im-
plications, 124 YALE L.T. 882, 88 Q (2015).
24. See, e.g., id. at 976, 979 (arguing that "the types of costs that are likely to be the largest on-
going costs were not quantified,' and that cost-benefit analysis "can camouflage the effects
of rulemaking, rather than discipline it"); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost
Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S351, S352 (2014).
25. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1131, 1137 (2012); see also Lyndsey Layton, Unsafe Eggs Linked to U.S. Failure To Act,
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suggested that collaboration is legally required.2 6 Part III describes my model
of judicial review and considers how the SEC and CFTC might respond if this
model were put into practice.27 In addition, Part III examines cases in which
other agencies have collaborated voluntarily and argues that the form of judi-
cial oversight I endorse would grant the SEC and CFTC broad discretion to
choose the most effective method of harmonizing their rules.
My argument applies not only to swaps, but also to other areas in which the
APA and cost-benefit requirements could reduce some of the inefficiencies that
occur when Congress requires agencies to administer regulatory initiatives
jointly. New regulations are not written on a blank slate; they interact with a
complicated and dynamic administrative apparatus. Agencies must therefore
consider how their rules will interact and whether these interactions under-
mine the effectiveness of new rules.
I. THE EFFECTS OF INCONSISTENT SWAPS REGULATION
Congress enacted Dodd-Frank in the wake of the 2008 recession to reduce
risk in U.S. financial markets. In this part, I explain how Title VII of Dodd-
Frank seeks to accomplish this goal. I then identify two elements of Dodd-
WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2010/12/10/AR2olol21oo 7194.html [http://perma.cc/A35M-GA7Q] ("Fractured oversight
remains a problem today. There are more than 15 federal agencies and 71 interagency agree-
ments dealing with food safety. Experts in public health and government accountability say
that fragmentation weakens oversight, wastes tax dollars through redundancy and creates
dangerous gaps.").
26. To my knowledge, only one case has implied that the SEC and CFTC may have a legal obli-
gation to collaborate in certain situations. That case, Investment Co. Institute v. SEC, 720 F.3 d
370 (D.C. Cir. 2013), considered whether the CFTC had adequately considered the SEC's
regulatory regime when adopting a new rule. The D.C. Circuit held that the agencies must
consider how their rules will be affected by existing rules, and found that the CFTC had giv-
en adequate reasons for diverging from the SEC's rule. Had the D.C. Circuit reached a
different factual conclusion and found that the CFTC had not given adequate reasons, it
might have established that the agencies have a legal obligation to collaborate when they
cannot give good reasons for regulatory inconsistencies. See infra Part III for a more detailed
discussion of Investment Co. Institute.
27. Specifically, Part III surveys a variety of both financial and non-financial regulatory actions
that involve duplicative and overlapping jurisdictions. It turns out that there are many effec-
tive and efficient ways for the SEC and CFTC to harmonize their regulations. This argu-
ment is intended to clarify my view that judicial enforcement of cost-benefit and APA re-
quirements actually empowers agencies to a greater degree than legislative or executive
oversight by allowing agencies to exercise wide discretion in choosing how to collaborate.
Other models, by contrast, generally involve an outside actor stepping in and forcing agen-




Frank-swap-reporting rules and SEF rules -in which inconsistencies between
the SEC's rules and the CFTC's rules impose unnecessary costs without provid-
ing any identifiable benefit. I further argue that these conflicting rules ulti-
mately compromise Dodd-Frank's goal of controlling systemic risk.
A. The 2oo8 Recession and Title VII of Dodd-Frank
The Great Recession of 2008 is widely considered to be the worst economic
crisis since the Great Depression.28 Despite aggressive and unprecedented
efforts by the Department of Treasury and the Federal Reserve, unemployment
rose to ten percent - a thirty-year high29 - and housing prices fell thirty-three
percent,o costing Americans $16.4 trillion in household wealth.
Although the causes of the financial crisis continue to be debated, 3 2 it is
clear that swaps - in particular, credit default swaps - played a critical role in
allowing individual companies to accrue risk sufficient to cause the global
economy to collapse. 3 Credit default swaps are akin to insurance on bonds.
28. See World Economic Outlook April 2009: Crisis and Recovery, INT'L MONETARY
FUND 9 (2009), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/20o9/ol/pdf/text.pdf [http://
perma.cc/WXSV-Q9CF] ("By any measure, this downturn represents by far the deepest
global recession since the Great Depression.").
29. The Recession of 2007-2009, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. 2 (2012), http://www.bls.gov
/spotlight/2o12/recession/pdf/recession-blsspotlight.pdf [http://perma.cc/LLF5-6NAB].
30. Jeffrey P. Cohen, Cletus C. Coughlin & David A. Lopez, The Boom and Bust of U.S. Housing
Prices from Various Perspectives, ST. Louis FED. RES. BOARD REV. 341, 344 (2012), http://
research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/12/o9/341-36SCohen.pdf [http://perma.cc
/MS6G-HQW9].
31. Chris Isidore, America's Lost Trillions, CNN: MONEY (June 9, 2011, 1:03 PM), http://
money.cnn.com/2oll/o6/o9/news/economy/householdwealth [http://perma.cc/9PF7
-YWW6].
32. See, e.g., JOHN A. ALLISON, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FREE MARKET CURE: WHY PURE
CAPITALISM IS THE WORLD ECONOMY'S ONLY HOPE (2013) (arguing that over-regulation in
the housing market created moral hazards that led to excessive risk-taking); JOHN CASSIDY,
How MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES (2009) (arguing that a market
bubble caused the crisis); SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010) (arguing that lax regulatory stand-
ards allowed banks to become too big and bankers to invent toxic financial products); MI-
CHAEL LEwIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010) (arguing that secu-
ritization created the housing bubble by allowing bankers to make loans to people who
could not afford to repay them and then to shift the risk off of their balance sheets).
33. For a description of the evolution of the credit default swaps market, including their poten-
tial uses to shift credit risk, see Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of
Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019 (20o6-07), which discusses the benefits
of, and the risks posed by, credit default swaps; Ron Hera, Forget About Housing, the the
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When a bank buys a bond, say from General Electric (GE), the bank expects to
receive a steady stream of payments from GE over the life of the bond. Howev-
er, if GE were to go bankrupt, the bank would stop receiving those payments.
To hedge against that possibility, the bank might buy a credit default swap
from another company. The credit default swap would require the bank to pay
a premium at regular intervals. In exchange, the company that sold the credit
default swap would agree to pay a large sum if the entity that borrowed funds
from the bank cannot afford to pay the interest on its bond. As long as GE can
afford to pay its interest payments, the bank loses its premium payments. But if
GE were to go bankrupt, then the bank would receive money from the party
that sold the bank the credit default swap. In this way, credit default swaps al-
low companies to insure against the possibility that a counterparty will not be
able to honor its obligations.
At the end of 2007, the credit default swaps market was worth $6o tril-
lion.34 Companies used credit default swaps to protect against nearly every
possible contingency, from changes in bonds and stocks to fluctuations in in-
terest rates and housing prices." The portfolio of one credit default swap seller,
AIG, covered bonds worth more than $440 billion.3 6 AIG did not have suffi-
cient funds to honor all of its obligations. As a result, Moody's Investor Service,
a credit rating agency, downgraded AIG's credit rating. Because of the terms of
the credit default swap contracts, AIG had to post more collateral-which it did
not have-to guarantee its ability to pay its credit default swap obligations.
AIG's inability to make good on its credit default swap obligations thus meant
that banks immediately lost their insurance on $440 billion worth of bonds. 7
Overnight, the banks were worth billions less." This, in turn, meant that
banks had less money to lend, which meant that other banks had to borrow at
[sic] Real Cause of the Crisis Was OTC Derivatives, Bus. INSIDER: FINANCE (May 11, 2010,
2:50 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/bubble-derivatives-otc-20o-5 [http://perma
.cc/5UPL-4WJ2].
34. Adam Davidson, The Big Money: How AIG Fell Apart, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2008, 10:27 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-how-aig-fell-apart-idUSMAR8S5972720080919 [http://
perma.cc/6D9Q-9JSU]. As a point of reference, global GDP that year was $57.6 trillion. See
World GDP by Year, MULTPL (2015), http://www.multpl.com/world-gdp/table/by-year
[http://perma.cc/88ER-E5RQ].
35. See Rene M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 85-92
(2010).






higher costs." Some banks no longer had enough money available to cover
their costs. Others could not afford to borrow under these new terms. Weak
banks faced collapse, which threatened to cause the money supply to contract
further. Absent a government intervention, the inability of AIG, a single firm,
to make good on its credit default swap obligations exposed the entire global
economy to substantial risk.40 A similar story played out with Lehman Broth-
ers, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch, among others, though in the case of Leh-
man Brothers, the government allowed the company to fail.41
One of the reasons that individual companies such as AIG were able to as-
sume such risky positions was because before Dodd-Frank, swaps were gener-
ally traded "over-the-counter" (OTC).4 2 In other words, deals were negotiated
and executed privately between two parties.43 As a result, there was no central
repository of information and no way for regulators or counterparties to de-
termine if an individual counterparty would be able to honor its swap obliga-
tions. Banks were unable to discover how badly other banks were affected, and
so at the first sign of trouble, these financial institutions stopped lending to
each other out of fear that their counterparties were overexposed.44 As the
CFTC has noted, OTC trading made the swaps market "less transparent than
39. Id.
40. Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. To Take OverAIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks In-
ject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2008, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB122156561931242905 [http://perma.cc/4LGH-Q53R].
41. See Arrick Mollenkamp et al., Lehman Files for Bankruptcy, Merrill Sold, AIG Seeks
Cash, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 20o8, 6:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB12214 5492o9 7 03 5549 [http://perma.cc/GLM8-9IKZ6].
42. See DODD-FRANK'S TITLE VII: OTC DERIVATIVES REFORM, ERNST & YOUNG 1
(2013), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Key questions-board members sho
uldaskaboutTitleVII/$FILE/AmericasjFAAS Dodd Frank derivativesreform.pdf
[http://perma.cc/H6DN-QTXE].
43 Id.
44. See Jose Berrospide, Liquidity Hoarding and the Financial Crisis: An Empirical Evaluation,
BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS 1 (2012), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/events/bhbibe
/berrospide.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZME4-F9PU] (finding that, during the financial crisis,
"banks held more liquid assets in anticipation of future expected losses from securities
write-downs"); see also Asani Sarkar, Liquidity Risk, Credit Risk, and the Federal Reserve's Re-
sponses to the Crisis, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. STAFF REP. 389 (Sept. 2009), http://www.new
yorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff reports/sr389.pdf [http://perma.cc/KTK3
-XWLC] ("The empirical evidence supports the Fed's views on the primacy of balance sheet
constraints in the earlier stages of the crisis and the increased prominence of counterparty
credit risk as the crisis evolved in 2008.").
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exchange-traded futures and securities markets."45 The CFTC went on to de-
scribe " [t]his lack of transparency [as] a major contributor to the 2008 finan-
cial crisis because regulators and market participants lacked visibility to identi-
fy and assess the implications of swaps market exposures and counterparty
relationships."4 6 The lack of swaps exchanges and reliable reporting systems
thus enabled single companies, such as AIG, to take significant and sizable po-
sitions that left the global financial system at risk.47
Congress passed Dodd-Frank in 2010 in direct response to the recession.4 8
The statute's goal was to prevent another crisis of such scale and to "promote
the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system."4 9 To that end, Title VII of Dodd-Frank
established a new framework for the regulation of the swaps market by author-
45. Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities, 78 Fed. Reg. 33,476,
33,476 (June 4, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R. Pt. 37); see also The Financial Crisis Inquiry Re-
port: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis
in the United States, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION 299, 352, 363-64, 386, 621 n.56
(2011), http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn media/fcic-reports/fcic-finalreportjfull.pdf
[http://perma.cc/H4A6-ZEFP] (describing how OTCs' lack of transparency contributed to
the 2008 financial crisis and the general sense of panic that followed).
46. Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities, 78 Fed. Reg. at
33,476.
47. Scholars have compared the panic caused by AIG's collapse to a bank run. See Gary Gorton,
Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2oo7, FED. RES. BANK AT-
LANTA 2 (May 9, 2009), http://www.frbatlanta.org/-/media/Documents/news/conferences
/20o9/financial-markets-conference/gorton.pdf [http://perma.cc/NM25-YQGU] ("The
U.S. had a banking panic starting in August 2007, one that continues today."). Note that my
analysis of the financial crisis is not meant to explain the full causes of the crisis, but rather
to give a watered-down explanation of how swaps allowed individual firms to accrue risk
sufficient to endanger the entire American economy. For a deeper analysis of the causes of
the crisis, and in particular of how the swaps market interacted with the repurchase market
to spread risk, see Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo,
MOODY'S (Nov. 13, 20o9), http://www.moodys.com/microsites/crc2olo/papers/gorton run
on repo nov.pdf [http://perma.cc/ICZHq-DXKD].
48. Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Ur-
ban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony
/bernanke2onlo217a.htm [http://perma.cc/MTC3-K2AE] ("The Dodd-Frank Act addresses
critical gaps and weaknesses in the U.S. regulatory framework, many of which were revealed
by the recent financial crisis."); Richard C. Longworth, Geithner and Paulson: Reflections on
Financial Crises, CHI. COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFF. (May 28, 2014), http://www
.thechicagocouncil.org/event/geithner-and-paulson-reflections-financial-crises [http://
perma.cc/GD6L-BKC9].




izing the SEC and CFTC to regulate OTC derivatives, including swaps.so Un-
der Title VII, the SEC and CFTC must establish margin requirements," rules
for clearing and trade execution,5 2 and real-time reporting. 3 These rules ensure
that the vast majority of transactions are reported to regulators, that swaps are
traded on a market rather than through bilateral transactions, and that one
firm's inability to honor its obligations does not bankrupt the firm's counter-
parties.
Key to these reforms was creating pre- and post-trade transparency in swap
deals. Reporting requirements attempt to provide post-trade transparency by
ensuring that upon the completion of every swap, regulators and market par-
ticipants can receive volume and pricing information.54 Reporting require-
50. The CFTC regulates "swaps,' and the SEC regulates "security-based swaps." Both have au-
thority over "mixed swaps." Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 721, 761, 124 Stat. 1376,
1658-72, 1754-59 (2010) (codified at is U.S.C. 5 8102).
51. Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major
Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, 77 Fed Reg.
70,214, 70,215 (Nov. 23, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 24o) (describing capital, margin, and
segregation rules).
52. Clearing Agency Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 66,220 (Nov. 2, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
240) (adopting clearing agency standards); Process for Submissions for Review of Security-
Based Swaps for Mandatory Clearing and Notice Filing Requirements for Clearing Agen-
cies; Technical Amendments to Rule 19 b- 4 and Form 19 b-4 Applicable to All Self-
Regulatory Organizations, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,602 (July 13, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 24o,
249) (adopting clearing procedures).
53. Business Conduct Standards for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based
Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,396 (July 18, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240)
(providing standards for external business conduct); End-User Exception to Mandatory
Clearing of Security-Based Swaps, 75 Fed. Reg. 79,992 (Dec. 21, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 240) (detailing end-user exceptions); Trade Acknowledgment and Verification of Securi-
ty-Based Swap Transactions, 76 Fed. Reg. 3859 (Jan. 21, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240)
(providing trade acknowledgement rules); Regulation SBSR-Reporting and Dissemination
of Security-Based Swap Information, 75 Fed. Reg. 75,208 (Dec. 2, 2010) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240, 242) (detailing reporting rules); Registration and Regulation of Security-
Based Swap Execution Facilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,948 (proposed Feb. 28, 2011) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249) (adopting registration framework for execution facili-
ties); Security-Based Swap Data Repository Registration, Duties, and Core Principles, 75
Fed. Reg. 77,3o6 (proposed Dec. io, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249), correct-
ed at 75 Fed. Reg. 79,320 (proposed Dec. 20, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
249) and 76 Fed. Reg. 2287 (proposed Jan. 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
249) (providing data repository rules); Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and
Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 65,784 (Oct. 24, 2011) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) (detailing registration rules for dealers and major swap participants);.
54. See Registration of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77 Fed. Reg. 2613, 2613 (Jan.
19, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 23, 170) (identifying the goals of Dodd-Frank and
summarizing how the regulation helps accomplish those goals).
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ments seek to ensure that regulators and market participants can look at the
swaps market and identify systemic risk early enough to prevent a financial cri-
sis." Title VII sought to create pre-trade transparency by establishing SEFs, or
trading platforms roughly analogous to stock exchanges that allow swap partic-
ipants to trade swaps on a competitive exchange.5 6 The existence of competitive
trading platforms makes information about swaps available to the market by
making swap bids (offers to buy a swap if certain terms are met) and offers
(offers to sell a swap if certain terms are met) available to interested parties.
Thus, Dodd-Frank seeks to bring swaps out of the opaque world of bilateral
backroom dealing by forcing parties in a swap deal to use transparent trading
systems and platforms. 7
As a political compromise," Title VII divided oversight of swaps between
the SEC and the CFTC. It granted the SEC the authority to regulate security-
ss. Id.
56. Dodd-Frank defines an SEF as "a trading system or platform in which multiple participants
have the ability to execute or trade swaps by accepting bids and offers made by multiple par-
ticipants in the facility or system." 7 U.S.C. § la(5o) (2012). SEFs operate either (a) under
the regulatory oversight of the CFTC, pursuant to Section 5 h of the Commodity Exchange
Act, see 7 U.S.C. § 7 b- 3 (2012), or (b) under the regulatory oversight of the SEC, see Regis-
tration and Regulation of Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, 76 Fed. Reg. at 10,948.
57. See Registration of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77 Fed. Reg. at 2613.
58. The CFTC was originally conceived of as an agricultural regulator of futures contracts. As a
result, when the Commodity Exchange Act was enacted in 1936, the Department of Agricul-
ture was given authority to oversee and enforce the Act. See Commodity Exchange Act, Pub.
L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (establishing the CFTC). The SEC, by contrast, was
thought of as a securities regulator. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291,
48 Stat. 881 (1934) (establishing the SEC). By the late 1970s, however, the line between fu-
tures and securities began to blur. Futures markets began to list futures contracts whose un-
derlying products had nothing to do with agriculture. Applying a broad definition of "com-
modity;" the CFTC's jurisdiction grew to include transactions that shifted interest-rate
exposure specific to a particular loan and transactions that shifted the risk of default on par-
ticular bonds (i.e., credit default swaps). As these markets evolved, the agencies and Con-
gress debated who should regulate swaps transactions. A temporary ditente was reached in
1982, when Chairmen John Shad of the SEC and Philip Johnson of the CFTC negotiated the
"Shad-Johnson Accord,' which split jurisdiction between the two agencies along lines that
had more to do with historical jurisdiction than the economic reality of the swaps products
being regulated. See generally JERRY W. MARHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, VOLUME III: FROM THE AGE OF DERIVATIVES INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM (1970-
2001) 97 (2002); John D. Benson, Ending the Turf Wars: Support for a CFTC/SEC Consolida-
tion, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1175, 1179-80 (1991); Egon Guttman, The Futures Trading Act of 1978:
The Reaffirmation of CFTC-SEC Coordinated jurisdiction over Security/Commodities, 28 AM. U.
L. REV 1 (1978); Jerry W. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the Commodity Futures
Industry-History and Theory, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 59 (1991); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,




based swaps and the CFTC the authority to regulate all other swaps. 9 Yet the
Act did not define the terms "swap" and "security-based swap." Instead, Dodd-
Frank instructed the SEC and CFTC to issue a joint rulemaking defining those
terms,6 0 which the agencies did on August 13, 2012.61 By that time, however,
the CFTC had already issued a number of swap-related regulations.62 As a re-
sult, market participants had to begin setting up compliance programs without
knowing which financial instruments would eventually be subject to CFTC re-
quirements.
As a general rule, the CFTC oversees the majority of swaps, including
swaps based on interest or other monetary rates, and the SEC regulates swaps
CORD (2000); Simon Boughey, Dodd-Frank Gives Nod to Regulatory Turf Wars, FIN. NEWS
(Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2o11-02-14/dodd-frank-regulatory
-turf-wars [http://perma.cc/RPX5-G7E8] ("The reason for this apparent illogicality is to be
found in the pages of history, where one discovers a decades-long rivalry between the CFTC
and SEC over the governance of derivative instruments.").
59. See supra note 16. Overlapping regulations might be defended for maintaining historic agen-
cy expertise. In other contexts, historical expertise may offer compelling reasons for agencies
not to coordinate, but this is not the case with the regulation of swaps. While the SEC over-
sees certain types of swaps and the CFTC oversees other types of swaps, there is no princi-
pled reason why either agency should regulate the swaps under its jurisdiction. Originally,
the CFTC was conceived of as a futures regulator that would protect farmers from being
taken advantage of by savvy Chicago futures traders. See supra note 58. The vast majority of
swaps today, however, have nothing to do with farming. There is no meaningful difference
in terms of who trades swaps under one agency's jurisdiction and how those swaps are
structured.
6o. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1644 (2010).
61. See Further Definition of "Swap;' "Security-Based Swap,' and "Security-Based Swap Agree-
ment"; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,208,
48,349-54 (Aug. 13, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 230, 240-41) (defining those terms
and formally allocating rulemaking authority between the SEC and the CFTC). It is worth
noting that the CFTC is responsible for regulating a much larger percentage of swaps than
the SEC. The gross market value of credit default swaps subject to SEC jurisdiction is about
$278 billion. The gross market value of credit default swaps subject to CFTC jurisdiction is
just under $6 trillion. See OTC, Credit Default Swaps, by Type Position, BANK FOR INT'L SET-
TLEMENTS (May 4, 2016), http://www.bis.org/statistics/dio-a.pdf [http://perma.cc/JWSC
-Z4HS].
62. For example, the CFTC issued clearing and reporting rules at the end of 2010, nearly eight-
een months before defining the term "swap." See End-User Exception to Mandatory Clear-
ing of Security-Based Swaps, 75 Fed. Reg. 79,992 (Dec. 21, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
240) (detailing end-user exceptions); Security-Based Swap Data Repository Registration,
Duties, and Core Principles, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,3o6 (proposed Dec. io, 2010) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249), corrected at 75 Fed. Reg. 79,320 (proposed Dec. 20, 2010) (to be cod-
ified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) and 76 Fed. Reg. 2287 (proposed Jan. 13, 2011) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) (detailing data repository rules).
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based on a single security, loan, or narrow-based security index 63 -that is, a se-
curity index that has nine or fewer underlying securities. 64 Thus, if a party
wants to purchase a swap based on eight securities, it would be subject to SEC
rules, and if the party traded a swap based on ten securities, it would be subject
to CFTC rules.65
To be sure, Dodd-Frank attempted to reduce the costs of dual agency over-
sight of swaps by directing the SEC and CFTC to "adopt rules to ensure that
such transactions and accounts are subject to comparable requirements to the
extent practicable." 6 6 Yet as the rest of this Section shows, the SEC and CFTC
have been reluctant to follow this mandate, and the incompatibility of their
swaps rules has dramatically increased the costs of derivatives regulations and
thwarted regulatory attempts-and Congress's original goals-to make the
swaps market safer and more transparent.
B. Inconsistencies in Rules Governing Swap Reporting
In December 2011, the CFTC approved its final rule on swap data record-
keeping and reporting requirements. 67 The CFTC then issued additional final
rules governing swap reporting in March 2012, and swap dealers began report-
ing data for index-based and interest-rate swaps shortly thereafter.68 Over three
years later, in February 2015, the SEC issued its own final rule on the reporting
and public dissemination of security-based swap information. 69 Shortly there-
after, in August 2015, the CFTC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to re-
63. See 124 Stat. at 1644; see also Further Definition of "Swap," "Security-Based Swap," and "Se-
curity-Based Swap Agreement"; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Record-
keeping, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,208.
64. 7 U.S.C. § la(35) (2012) (defining a security-based swap as an index that has nine or fewer
component securities).
65. Although this description applies as a general matter, I should note that there are also three
alternative means for qualifying as a narrow-based security index. See 7 U.S.C. § la(35); see
also 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a68-lb (2016).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 780(c)(3)(C) (2012).
67. Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. 2136 (Jan. 13, 2012)
(codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 45); Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 77
Fed. Reg. 1182 (Jan. 9, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 43).
68. Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. at 2136; Real-Time
Public Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 77 Fed. Reg. at 1186.
69. Regulation SBSR- Reporting and Dissemination of Security-Based Swap Information, So




vise parts of its swaps rules.70 The Commission finalized these revisions ten
months later." While similar in many respects, the two rules reflect important
differences in terms of what must be reported and who must report the infor-
mation.
Swap transactions generally consist of the "initial transaction" between the
two parties and two "clearing transactions" between the clearing agency and
the two parties. In most cases, the CFTC and the SEC require that all three be
reported, but their requirements differ in certain cases. Under CFTC rules, if
the initial transaction is accepted for clearing prior to being reported, the deriv-
atives-clearing organization (rather than one of the parties to the swap) is re-
quired to report the initial transaction.7 2 Under SEC rules, one of the parties to
the initial transaction, rather than the clearing agency, is required to report the
initial security-based swap."
This inconsistency imposes substantial costs on the regulated community.
To comply with the CFTC's rules, financial institutions had to build reporting
infrastructures in 2012 without knowing whether that infrastructure would be
compatible with the SEC's rules for security-based swaps. Then, three years
later, these institutions had to build new reporting infrastructures or update
their existing infrastructures in order to allow them to input separate reporting
requirements.'
For swaps not traded on a market, both the SEC and CFTC rules reflect an
understanding that more sophisticated parties will be better able to understand
reporting requirements, build infrastructure, and bear the cost of reporting.
For those swaps, the CFTC's reporting rules place the reporting onus first on
any swap-dealer counterparty, then on any major swap-participant counterpar-
ty and then, only if neither of those are involved in a swap, on an entity that is
70. Amendments to Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements for Cleared Swaps,
So Fed. Reg. 52,544 (proposed Aug. 31, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. Pt. 45).
71. Amendments to Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements for Cleared Swaps,
81 Fed. Reg. 41,736 (June 27, 2016) (codified at 17 C.F.R. Pt. 45).
72. Id.
73. Regulation SBSR-Reporting and Dissemination of Security-Based Swap Information, 81
Fed. Reg. 53,546, 53,613 (Aug. 12, 2016) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
74. See Annette L. Nazareth & Gabriel D. Rosenberg, The New Regulation of Swaps: A Lost Op-
portunity, 55 COMP. ECON. STUD. 535, 545 (2013) (arguing that "the task [of building compli-
ance programs with Title VII of Dodd-Frank] has been made all but impossible by the radi-
cally different timeline on which the CFTC and SEC are proposing and adopting their rules
and the fact that, particularly on the CFTC's side, the swaps rule proposals have been adopt-
ed in an illogical order").
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not a swap dealer or major swap participant." The SEC's rule generally follows
the same reporting order with one crucial difference-if only one party to the
swap is defined as a U.S. person (i.e., incorporated in the United States), that
person is responsible for reporting.7 6
As Annette Nazareth and Gabriel Rosenberg have pointed out, what
emerges is a bifurcated reporting regime with puzzling results." Consider two
variants of a standard swap deal. First, imagine that an American corporation
enters into an index credit default swap with a London-based swap dealer. Be-
cause the transaction involves an index credit default swap, it is subject to
CFTC rules." The swap dealer is responsible for the immediate reporting of
the transaction, and the American corporation is responsible for updating the
initial report for the duration of the swap." Now imagine that the American
company and the London-based swap dealer enter into a credit default swap on
a single asset instead of an index. In this case, the transaction would be gov-
erned by SEC rules, so an American corporation would be responsible for re-
porting the transaction.so Data repositories are repeat players in the swaps
market and are therefore likely to understand their reporting obligations. Indi-
vidual corporations, by contrast, may trade swaps infrequently. It is therefore
likely that they will lack reporting infrastructure and may not even know that
they have a duty to report. Forcing individual companies -especially small
companies that lack experience in financial markets - to report swap infor-
mation already imposes a fairly substantial burden on swap participants. This
inefficiency is aggravated by the fact that companies must comply with two
different regimes. Every American company that wants to trade swaps must
therefore understand not only that they are occasionally responsible for report-
ing the initial swap transaction, but also that this requirement differs depend-
ing on which set of rules governs a swap. The agencies could have avoided this
inefficiency by agreeing on a single, consistent reporting framework. Indeed,
neither agency has provided a sufficient explanation for its decision to enact
75. Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 1182, 1197, 1236 (Jan. 9,
2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. Pt. 43).
76. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and
Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and
Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968, 31,o65, 31,o66 (proposed
May 23, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249).
77. See Nazareth & Rosenberg, supra note 74, at 541.
78. See Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 77 Fed. Reg. at 1182.
79. See id. at 1197.
so. Regulation SBSR- Reporting and Dissemination of Security-Based Swap Information, 81




regulations that diverge from the other regulator's rules in costly but seemingly
insignificant ways.
Additional costs arise from distinct requirements about what data must be
reported. While the CFTC's rules include detailed tables of required data ele-
ments for various types of swaps,8 2 the SEC initially set out only the basic ele-
ments of reportable information in its final rule on swap reporting, leaving the
data repositories that store SEC-traded swaps responsible for sorting out the
details for each product type." Nor does the SEC ask for underlying valuation
data.84 in contrast, the CFTC requires that the derivatives-clearing organization
report daily valuation data. " And, if the reporting counterparty for the initial
transaction is a swap dealer or major swap participant, then the counterparty is
also responsible for reporting daily valuation data.86 Both the SEC and CFTC
reporting regimes use coded identifiers (IDs) to identify a person, product, or
transaction.8 7 However, the SEC requires more granular information on the
parties executing the transaction, including IDs related to the broker, trader,
trading desk, counterparty, product, and transaction." By contrast, the CFTC
requires only that swap participants report the legal-entity identifiers of the
parties to a swap, as well as the unique product and unique swap identifiers."
The SEC and CFTC also disagree about the definition of block trades,
which are large trades with the potential to move the market.90 The CFTC, but
81. For a discussion of the agencies' justifications for these divergences, see infra Section I.D.
82. See Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 77 Fed. Reg. at 1249-62.
83. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and
Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and
Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968, 31,071 (proposed May 23,
2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249).
84. See id. at 31,093.
85. Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 77 Fed. Reg. at 1197. The CFTC
amended this requirement on June 27, 2016 to clarify that the requirement that the reporting
party provide valuation data "appl[ies] to all swaps," not just to "cleared swaps." Amend-
ments to Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements for Cleared Swaps, 81
Fed. Reg. 41,736, 41,746 (June 27, 2016) (codified at 17 C.F.R. Pt. 45).
86. Id.
87. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,214; Real-Time Public
Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 77 Fed. Reg. at 1212.
88. Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,211-13.
89. Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 77 Fed. Reg. at 1184.
go. See generally Frequently Asked Questions About Block Trade Reporting Requirements, MORR-
ISON & FOERSTER (2016), http://media.mofo.com/files/uploads/Images/FAQs-Block-Trade
-Reporting-Requirements.pdf [http://perma.cc/4VCD-8VZD].
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not the SEC, has set minimum amounts for block trades." In contrast, the
SEC's proposed rule would delegate to swap data repositories the authority to
establish policies and procedures for calculating which trades constitute block
trades.9 2 The SEC defended this decision for preserving flexibility." However,
it did not mention the fact that inconsistent rules about block trades will force
market participants, data repositories, and clearinghouses to set up two differ-
ent programs to report and execute the largest and most significant block
trades.
The table below shows important differences between SEC and CFTC re-
quirements for reporting swap information to swap data repositories:"
TABLE 1.
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR SWAP DATA REPOSITORIES (SDRS)
Note: DCO: derivatives clearing organization, SBS: security-based swap, SBSD: security-
based swap dealer, SDR: swap data repository, SIP: securities information processor, UIC:
unique identification code
CFTC Rules SEC Rules
Reporting Party one-sided reporting:
reporting counterparty reporting side
reports to an SD)R based on a reporting hierarchy (inconsist-
encies likely result because of differences in "swt ap dealer" and
SBSD registrations).
91. The CFTC defines block size as the greater of (a) the ninety-fifth percentile of transaction
size in that category of swap instrument in the past calendar year (distribution test) and (b)
the largest of five times the mean, median, and mode of transaction sizes for that category
swap instrument over the past calendar year (social size multiple test). See Procedures To
Establish Appropriate Minimum Block Sizes for Large Notional Off-Facility Swaps and
Block Trades, 78 Fed. Reg. ;2,865, 32,868 (May 31, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R. Pt. 43).
92. Regulation SBSR-Reporting and Dissemination of Security-Based Swap Information, 75
Fed. Reg. 75,208, 75,228 (proposed Dec. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242).
93. Id.
94. Adapted from Memorandum from Gibson Dunn to Our Clients and Friends, U.S. SEC Im-
plements Dodd-Frank Act Title VII: Reporting and Public Dissemination Rules for Securi-







Enitity to Whiichi Data is
Reported
Use of Identifiers




Data To Be Publicly Dis-
seminated
Block Trades
"As soon as technologically
practicable" from the time of
execution, with backstops
based on asset class, coun-
terparty, and implementa-
tion timing; reporting coun-
terparties cannot hold the
reports.
SDI's registered w\ithl the
Requires legal entity identi-
fiers for parties to the swap,
a unique product identifier,
and a unique swap identifier.
Provides specific data fields
that must be reported to an
SDR'; also prov ides, tlat the
SDR, may,1 ask for additionll
iniformilationl anld specify the
formilat.
If the DCO accepts a swap
for clearing, requires the
DCO to report the initial
swap to the SDR; requires
resulting swaps with the
DCO to be reported by the
DCO to the SDR; requires
the reporting of daily valua-
tion data for cleared swaps
by the DCO and by the swap
dealer/major swap partici-
pant.
PermIIits, repor ting,, of conltin]-
uation01 data for sapst) using1
snlapshIot or state data.
All data fields in Appendix A
to Part 43 of the CFTC's
regulations; notional
amounts to be publicly dis-
seminated are capped; cer-
tain information is masked
when disseminated.
Specific rules Iand sizes for
block trades in all asset clas-
ses set forth in CFTC regula-
tion 43.6 and Appendix F to
Part 43-
Twenty-four-hour window
(or longer if next day is not a
business day) from the time of
execution for all trades, subject
to revision by the Commission
upon additional market stud-
ies; reporting sides can hold
the reports.
SDI's registered w\ithi theSEC
anld register ed as" SI11s.
Requires UICs for parties to
the SBS, asset managers, plat-
forms, brokers, trading desks,
individual traders, branches,
products, and transactions.
data elements for the pr ct
type; requires SDI'\ to estabt-
lishI an1d publtishI p)oliciesIand
prIocedurIes setting1,tle repor1t-
able data elemets and for-
mats1.1 for SBS iniformilationl.
Requires the counterparty
(i.e., reporting side) to the
initial SBS to report to the
SDR; does not require result-
ing SBS with the clearing
agency to be reported to the
SDR at this time; does not
require reporting of valuation
data for cleared SBSs.
Permilits oly snpho eport-
ing` for con~tHiuatiodata
All data fields reported to an
SDR, except those defined in
Rule 902(c).
Treats block trades like all
other SBS transactions:, sub-
ject to revision by the SEC up-
on additional market studies.
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Embargo Rule Data cannot be shared until Data cannot be shared until
reportable swap data is reportable SBS data is "sent"
"sent" to the SDR. to the SDR; exception for
post-trade affiliates of coun-
terparties.
Market participants repeatedly expressed concerns about the costs of com-
plying with inconsistent swaps rules during both agencies' rulemaking pro-
cesses. For example, in a comment letter on the SEC's proposed rule on data
repositories, the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC), one of the
four swap-reporting organizations currently registered with the CFTC,` urged
the SEC and the CFTC to "harmonize the regimes that oversee [swap data re-
positories]." 96 DTCC emphasized that "harmonization is a more important pri-
ority than the exact nature of the consistent standard, as SDRs can adjust to
meet a single standard but not multiple, inconsistent standards."" Gibson
Dunn echoed DTCC's complaint, arguing that "[w]here regulatory require-
ments diverge, market participants must develop practical and sound reporting
policies and procedures for each respective reporting regime.""
95. See Swap Data Repository Organizations, CFTC, http://sirt.cftc.gov/sirt/sirt.aspxTopic=Data
Repositories [http://perma.cc/WWJ5-KR6Z].
96. Letter from Larry E. Thompson, Gen. Counsel, Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., to Eliza-
beth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC 4 (Jan. 24, 2011) (on file with author).
97. Id. at 3. DTCC was equally forceful in a comment letter on the SEC's Regulation SBSR:
"Given the significant number of registered entities (execution platforms, clearinghouses,
SDRs, dealers, and major swap participants) that will face dual oversight, unnecessary dis-
tinctions in the registration and regulation of these entities risk jeopardizing regulatory
compliance, add confusion to Dodd-Frank Act implementation, and ultimately impose un-
necessary costs." Letter from Larry E. Thompson, Gen. Counsel, Depository Tr & Clearing
Corp., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC (Aug. 21, 2013) (on file with author). The Secu-
rities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) echoed the DTCC's claims:
" [T]he Commission can greatly improve the quality of the swap data being reported by es-
tablishing uniform standards for swap .... [U]niform reporting standards would allow the
Commission and other global financial regulators to easily compare data across multiple
SDRs to develop a clear picture of the swap markets." Letter from Timothy W. Cameron,
Managing Dir., Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n, to Melissa D. Jurgens, Sec'y, CFTC, Com-
ments Regarding Review of Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements
(RIN 3038 -AE12) (May 27, 2014), http://www.sifma.org/comment-letters/2o14/sifma-amg
-submits-comments-to-the-cftc-regarding-swap-data-recordkeeping-and-reporting-rules
[http://perma.cc/XH8Z-9X69].
98. Memorandum from Gibson Dunn to Our Clients and Friends, supra note 94, at 17. Gibson
Dunn specified that "differences between the asset classes under the SEC's jurisdiction com-
pared to the CFTC's jurisdiction will require SDRs to specify the differences in the data ele-
ments in their policies and procedures." Id. at 6. Cleary Gottlieb also noted that efforts to




Others have expressed concern that regulatory inconsistencies will prevent
market participants from using swap data. The Securities Industry and Finan-
cial Markets Association (SIFMA), an interest group that represents the securi-
ties industry," asked that market participants be able to "review [swap data-
repository] reported trade information for trades executed on behalf of clients,
or otherwise process such information in an automated fashion"; that "client
trade information [be] made available to asset managers in an easily accessible,
easy to read format"; and that "consistent specifications and reporting fields
[be] utilized to harmonize reporting requirements across jurisdictions and to
ensure the interoperability of such information."'0 0 SIFMA worried that regula-
tory inconsistencies would make it impossible for buyers to analyze the market
and monitor the exposure of their counterparties. In the case of swaps not trad-
ed on exchanges, inconsistencies between SEC and CFTC rules would there-
fore prevent buyers from assessing the competitiveness of the products they
purchase. Though SIFMA discussed the operational difficulties of inconsistent
regulations, its concerns point to a potentially more pernicious cost than those
associated with mere compliance. Not only will buyers' inability to analyze the
swaps market increase the cost of engaging in transactions, but it will also pre-
vent swap counterparties, who are the first line of defense against systemically
risky positions, from detecting those build-ups.
Data incompatibility also threatens to undermine regulators' ability to de-
tect destabilizing swap build-ups. As even regulators themselves have admit-
ted, inconsistent swaps rules make it more difficult to supervise the swaps
market. The astronomical losses caused by the London Whale, discussed
above, show that this concern is not merely hypothetical. In a speech about the
challenges that the CFTC faced in analyzing data promulgated solely under its
rules, CFTC Commissioner Scott O'Malia drew attention to the London Whale
incident and offered a frank assessment of the obstacles posed by inconsistent
swap reporting. Noting that "[ti he goal of data reporting is to provide the
tial additional costs: "In some cases, the SEC has sought to harmonize its approach with
that of the CFTC. Despite these efforts, however, enough differences exist between the Final
CFTC Reporting Rules and the Final SEC Reporting Rules that firms will likely need to
make significant modifications to their existing reporting systems to comply with the
Final SEC Reporting Rules." Memorandum from Cleary Gottlieb, SEC Adopts Rules
Regarding Reporting and Dissemination of Security-Based Swap Information and Proposes
Further Amendments to the Reporting Rules II (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.cleary
gottlieb.com/-/media/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/sec-adopts-rules-regarding-reporting
-and-dissemination-of-security-based-swap.pdf [http://perma.cc/5LW7-WBS31.
99. About SIFMA, SEC. INDUSTRY & FIN. MKTS. AssocIATION, http://www.sifma.org/about
[http://perma.cc/U7W3-7Y45].
ioo. Letter from Timothy W. Cameron to Melissa D. Jurgens, supra note 97.
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Commission with the ability to look into the market and identify large swap
positions that could have a destabilizing effect on our markets," the Commis-
sioner reported that "the Commission's progress in understanding and utilizing
the data in its current form and with its current technology is not going
well." 0 ' Commissioner O'Malia pointed out that formatting incompatibilities
rendered the reams of swap information submitted to the CFTC effectively
useless. According to Commissioner O'Malia, because the CFTC did not speci-
fy in what format reporting parties should submit data, the Commission had
been unable to track and analyze developments in the swaps market.102 Com-
missioner O'Malia also noted that members of the CFTC's staff had acknowl-
edged that they "currently cannot find the London Whale in the current data
file,"o and he went on to testify that destabilizing swap positions will only be
visible to the SEC and the CFTC if the Commissions "work to harmonize rules
sets as far as possible, particularly in clearing, trading and reporting."104
Recall that a primary objective of Dodd-Frank was to increase transparency
in the swaps market. 0 s In furtherance of this goal, reporting requirements
were intended to help agencies identify swap positions that could endanger the
global economy. 106 The trading losses incurred by the London Whale, however,
illustrate how reporting incompatibilities have already prevented regulators
from identifying when parties have taken systemically important and risky
swaps positions. But even if the CFTC fixes its own internal reporting prob-
lems, differences between its reporting requirements and those issued by the
SEC will present regulators with additional challenges. In addition to imposing
perplexing and unjustified costs on market participants, these inconsistencies
will continue to impede detection of systemically important swap positions.
101. Scott D. O'Malia, Comm'r, CFTC, Keynote Address at SIFMA Compliance and Legal Socie-
ty Annual Seminar: CFTC's Implementation of Dodd Frank-Grading Agency Trans-




104. Dodd-Frank Turns Five: Assessing the Progress of Global Derivatives Reforms: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Agric., 114 th Cong. 15 (2015) (statement of Scott D. O'Malia, CEO, Int'l Swaps
& Derivatives Ass'n), http://agriculture.house.gov/uploadedfiles/7.29.15_dodd frank.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6VAL-282W].
105. See supra notes 49, 56 and accompanying text.




C. Inconsistencies in Rules Governing SEFs
Like swap-reporting rules, inconsistent regulations governing SEFs raise
the costs of complying with Dodd-Frank while reducing transparency in the
market. An SEF is a regulated "trading system or platform in which multiple
participants have the ability to execute or trade swaps by accepting bids and
offers made by multiple participants in the facility."o7 For swaps traded on an
exchange, Dodd-Frank charges the SEC with regulating security-based swaps
and the CFTC with regulating most other swaps.as As soon as the CFTC final-
ized its SEF rules in 2013, market participants began building SEFs to conform
with the agency's rules.' In contrast, the SEC issued its proposed rules in
2011, but it has yet to finalize them. 1 0
107. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 721(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1670 (2010) (codified as amended
at 7 U.S.C. § la(5o) (2012)). Section 733 of Dodd-Frank amended the Commodity Exchange
Act to move swap trading and execution to SEFs and designated contract markets (DCMs).
See id. § 733, 124 Stat. at 1712 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 7 b- 3 (2012)). Section
723(a)(3) of Dodd-Frank added a trade execution requirement, which requires that swap
transactions subject to the clearing requirement under section 2(h)(1) of the Commodity
Exchange Act be executed on an SEF or a DCM, unless no SEF or DCM "makes the swap
available to trade" or the clearing exception under section 2(h)(7) of the Commodity Ex-
change Act applies. See id. § 723(a)(3), 124 Stat. at 1675-81 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
5 2(h)(1)-(8) (2012)).
108. See id. § 721, 124 Stat. at 1666-69 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47) (2012)) (noting
CFTC's jurisdiction); id. § 763(a), 124 Stat. at 1762 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3 (2012))
(noting SEC's jurisdiction). Dodd-Frank also amended the Securities and Exchange Act to
provide that "[n] o person may operate a facility for the trading or processing of security-
based swaps, unless the facility is registered as a security-based swap execution facility or as
a national securities exchange . . . ." See id., 124 Stat. at 1770 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c-
4(a)(1) (2012)). This section exempts security-based swaps from the clearing requirement
where one of the counterparties to the SB Swap: "(A) is not a financial entity; (B) is using
security-based swaps to hedge or mitigate commercial risk; and (C) notifies the [SEC], in
the manner set forth by the [SEC], how it generally meets its financial obligations associated
with entering into non-cleared security-based swaps." See id., 124 Stat. at 1679 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78c-3(g)(1)(A)-(C) (2012)); see also End-User Exception to Mandatory Clearing
of Security-Based Swaps, 75 Fed. Reg. 79,992 (Dec. 21, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
iog. According to CFTC Chairman Tim Massad, the SEFs established under the CFTC's regime
are off to a running start: "Currently, we have nearly two dozen SEFs .... SEF trading ac-
counted for about half of the total average daily volume of interest rate derivatives in 2014.
And according to data by Clarus Financial Technology, over the first three quarters of 2015,
73 percent of credit default swaps were executed on-SEF -as were 69 percent of all interest
rate swaps." Timothy Massad, Chairman, CFTC, Keynote Remarks Before the Swap
Execution Facility Conference (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Speeches
Testimony/opamassad-32 [http://perma.cc/47EK-B2D7].
11o. Registration and Regulation of Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, 76 Fed. Reg.
10,948 (proposed Feb. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249).
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The critical distinction between the CFTC's SEF rules and the SEC's pro-
posed rules is whether the agency or the SEF should determine if a certain type
of transaction must be traded on an SEF... Both agencies agree that swaps that
are "made available for trading" must be traded on an SEF and that other
swaps can continue trading through bilateral transactions rather than on an ex-
change.112 However, the SEC has proposed that the agency should determine
which products are made available for trading," while under existing CFTC
rules, the SEFs themselves determine which products are made available for
trading, subject to CFTC approval.114
iii. Compare id. at 10,969 ("[A] SB swap would be considered to be 'made available to trade' on
an exchange or a SB SEF pursuant to Section 3C(h) of the Exchange Act should be made
pursuant to objective measures established by the Commission, rather than by one or a
group of SB SEFs."), with Methods of Execution for Required and Permitted Transactions,
17 C.F.R. § 37-9 (2016) (noting that this determination is made by the SEFs themselves).
112. Section 723(a)(3) of Dodd-Frank requires that transactions involving swaps subject to the
clearing requirement under section 2(h) (1) of the Commodity Exchange Act occur on an ex-
change, except where no DCM or SEF makes the swap "available to trade" or the swap
transaction is subject to the clearing exception under section 2(h)( 7 ) of the Commodity Ex-
change Act. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1681 (2010) (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(8) (2012)). Section 763(a) of Dodd-Frank requires that
transactions involving security-based swaps subject to the clearing requirement of subsec-
tion (a)(1) of section 3C of the Securities Exchange Act be executed on an exchange unless
no exchange or SB SEF makes the SB swap available to trade. See id. § 723(a), 124 Stat. at
1767 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(h)(2) (2012)).
113. See Registration and Regulation of Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, 76 Fed. Reg. at
10,969 ("The Commission does not, however, have sufficient data at this time to propose
the objective standards pursuant to which a determination whether a SB swap is 'made
available to trade' would be made . . . . We solicit comment in this release, however, on how
the Commission should craft an objective standard for whether a SB swap is 'made available
to trade.").
114. The finalized CFTC rules offer SEFs two ways of designating a new product "available to
trade'" The first way, referred to as the "approval" process, allows an SEF to request the
CFTC's approval of a new rule prior to its implementation. See 17 C.F.R. § 40.5 (2016). The
CFTC has forty-five days to review the proposed rule, but it may extend its review for an-
other forty-five days where novel or complex issues are present. See id. § 40.5(a)(9)(b). The
second process, referred to as the "self-certification" process, allows SEFs to submit new
rules to the CFTC under self-certification procedures. See id. § 40.6. The CFTC has ten
business days to review the rule before it is deemed certified and can be made effective. See
id. § 40.6(a) (3). However, the CFTC may stay certification for ninety days, during which
time it must provide a thirty-day public comment period. See id. § 40.5(c). In order to de-
termine that a swap is made available to trade, an SEF must find that the swap meets one or
more of the criteria listed in the rules, which include: " [w] hether there are ready and willing
buyers and sellers"; " [t]he frequency or size of transactions"; " [t]he trading volume"; " [t]he
number and types of market participants"; " [t]he bid/ask spread"; and " [t]he usual number




Buyers have expressed concern that allowing SEFs to determine when
swaps are available for trading will incentivize manipulative behavior. For ex-
ample, the Managed Funds Association, a group that represents the interests of
the hedge fund industry,"' asked the CFTC "to make the 'available for trading'
determination" itself.116 The Managed Funds Association worries that the dis-
cretion given to SEFs "will create considerable uncertainty among mar-
ket participants.""' It is concerned that individual SEFs will identify a product
that is not traded on other SEFs and quickly establish "an overnight monopoly"
over that product." This would reduce competition and favor larger, wealthier
SEFs. It would also force buyers who would like access to all types of swap
products to connect to all SEFs. Otherwise, buyers risk being crowded out of a
market because they are not connected to a SEF that trades a desirable product.
The CFTC SEF regime might therefore incentivize SEFs to determine oppor-
tunistically that a product has been made available for trading in order to estab-
lish a monopoly for that product. Because this opportunism is not available in
the SEC's regime, SEFs operating under the CFTC's rules are less likely to
choose to trade security-based swaps.
SEFs therefore need to decide whether to develop systems flexible enough
to meet both the CFTC's and SEC's requirements or whether to focus exclu-
sively on one asset class. If CFTC-specific and SEC-specific SEFs develop, mar-
ket participants will need to become members of and build technological con-
nections to both. Twenty-five SEFs currently operate under the CFTC rules, 1
which apply to seventy-three percent of credit default swaps and to sixty-nine
percent of all interest rate swaps.120 Because the CFTC market is so large, SEFs
The SEC proposes that the "made available for trade" determination be made by using
the following objective criteria: (1) "the aggregate amount of trading in the SB swap on ex-
changes and SB SEFs and in the [over-the-counter] market," or (2) the "overall volume" in
the SB Swap. See Registration and Regulation of Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities,
76 Fed. Reg. at 10,970.
115. See About MFA, MANAGED FUNDs AsS'N, http://www.managedfunds.org/about-mfa
[http://perma.cc/KCC9N-583H].
116. Letter from Stuart J. Kaswell, Exec. Vice President & Managing Dir., Gen. Counsel,
Managed Funds Ass'n, to David A. Stawick, Sec'y, CFTC 3 (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www
.managedfunds.org/wp-content/uploads/2o11/o6/3. 8. 11-CFTC. Swap_.Execution.Facilities
.Rules_ Final_.MFA .Letter.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y43-AC88].
117. Id.
118. Id.
ig. See Trading Organizations- Swap Execution Facilities, CFTC, http://sirt.cftc.gov/SIRT/SIRT
.aspxTopic=SwapExecutionFacilities [http://perma.cc/EA9Z-QNP5] (documenting that
twenty-eight organizations sought registration, three of which have since withdrawn).
120. See Massad, supra note lo9.
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may lack the incentive to create a separate infrastructure for the SEC's SEF re-
gime. And if SEFs do choose to specialize in one regulator's rules and create
separate SEFs for SEC or CFTC rules, then swap traders would have to pay for
additional SEF connections if they want to access all products. Thus, unless the
SEC changes the trade determination in its final rules, the agencies' failure to
harmonize their SEF rules will lead to the same outcome as in the reporting
context: inefficiencies without benefits.
D. Failure To Consider the Costs of Inconsistent Swaps Regulations
While the SEC and CFTC are certainly aware of the benefits of harmoniz-
ing their swaps regulations,121 the agencies have offered only cursory analyses
of the costs of inconsistent swaps regulations. The SEC's analysis of SEFs is a
powerful example. The Commission's cost-benefit analysis fills just two col-
umns in its forty-six-page notice in the Federal Register and does not once
mention the CFTC's regulations.122 The CFTC proposal is no different. As
MarketAxess, a company interested in trading both SEC- and CFTC-governed
swaps, pointed out, the CFTC's proposal "does not analyze the cost of organiz-
ing and operating a SEF," nor does it "consider the burden of its proposal or re-
view[] the regulatory costs of possible alternative regulatory approaches to its
proposal."123
This failure to consider harmonizing swaps regulations is not unique.12 4
The Commissions rarely mention how existing swaps rules might affect their
121. They have, for example, issued a joint report in which they acknowledge that " [i]mproving
coordination and cooperation between the SEC and CFTC is essential to achieving the Ad-
ministration's directive on harmonization going forward." A Joint Report of the SEC and the
CFTC on Harmonization of Regulation, SEC & CFTC lo (2009), http://www.sec.gov/news
/press/20o9/cftcjointreportiol6o9.pdf [http://perma.cc/VP67-Q5EA]. The joint report
contains several recommendations about how the SEC and the CFTC could "better coordi-
nate their operations, information-sharing, and regulations." Id.; see also id. at 14-15 (describ-
ing shared training, staffing, and technology programs for the SEC and CFTC). It specifical-
ly recommends "[a]n appropriate forum for discussion and communication between the
SEC and the CFTC to identify emerging regulatory risks and assess and quantify their im-
plications for investors and other market participants, and provide recommendations for so-
lutions would serve the agencies' harmonization initiative." Id. at 1o.
122. See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities, 78 Fed. Reg.
33,476 (June 4, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R. Pt. 37).
123. Letter from Richard M. McVey, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, MarketAxess Holdings
Inc., to David A. Stawick, Sec'y, CFTC 13 (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.marketaxess.com/pdfs
/3l489RichardMcVey.pdf [http://perma.cc/55AM-L7CF].
124. See Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with Coun-




cost-benefit analyses, and even when they do, their analyses either assert that
they have harmonized where possible, or simply raise the possibility that in-
consistent regulations are a problem. The agencies do not analyze inconsisten-
cies or otherwise consider harmonizing their rules. For example, in footnote
356 of the CFTC's proposed rule on margin requirements for uncleared swaps,
the agency acknowledges that regulatory arbitrage -the possibility that market
participants will modify their products in order to avoid the CFTC's margin re-
quirements-might render its proposed regulation less effective.125 The CFTC
further notes that if its margin requirements differ substantially from those of
the other regulators, "operational inefficiencies" may prevent traders from "uti-
lizing congruent operational and compliance infrastructure." 12 6 In plain Eng-
lish, the agency is acknowledging that companies may have to set up separate
compliance regimes for each agency's rules even though those rules regulate the
same type of financial product. But after admitting that the actions of other fi-
nancial regulators will affect whether its own regulations will require compa-
nies to set up more than one compliance program, the CFTC dismisses the
dangers of regulatory arbitrage by asserting that it has "consulted and coordi-
nated with" the appropriate regulators "in order to harmonize [their] respec-
tive margin rules to the greatest extent possible."12 7 However, the CFTC then
admits that " [t] he baseline against which the costs and benefits associated with
this rule will be compared is the status quo, [that is], the uncleared swaps mar-
kets as they exist today."128 Therefore, although the CFTC concedes that rules
promulgated by other agencies will determine whether its own rules are effec-
tive, the agency analyzes the costs and benefits of its rules against a backdrop of
the unregulated, pre-Dodd-Frank swapmarket.
Similarly, in response to comments requesting that the CFTC harmonize
pricing and reporting requirements with the SEC's rules, the CFTC acknowl-
edged the "concerns expressed," but countered that "industry solutions ... will
mitigate" those costs.12 9 Yet nowhere in the CFTC's eight-page cost-benefit
analysis does the CFTC explain why the benefits of its rule justify the costs to
market participants of implementing two different reporting systems. Nor did
C.F.R. pts. 23, 155); Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 75 Fed. Reg.
76,140, 76,167-68 (proposed Dec. 7, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. Pt. 43).
125. Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,
81 Fed. Reg. 636, 682 n.356 (Jan. 6, 2016) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 23, 140).
126. Id. at 682.
127. Id. (footnote omitted).
128. Id.
129. Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 1182, 1223 (Jan. 9, 2012)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 43).
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the CFTC justify its decision to force market participants to devise creative
compliance programs capable of accommodating two reporting regimes when
the alternative -consistent regulations -would have allowed market partici-
pants to develop a single reporting program.3 0 The CFTC's cost-benefit analy-
sis in its rules for block trades follow a similar pattern. The CFTC acknowl-
edged that several commenters urged the Commission to "harmoniz [e] with
the SEC's approach" to designating block trades,"' and a number of other
commenters asked the two agencies to "coordinate ... in setting minimum
block levels." 3 2 Yet after acknowledging these comments, the CFTC's cost-
benefit analysis did not walk through the benefits of coordinating with the SEC
or the costs of inconsistencies. 3
Like the CFTC's rules, the SEC's final reporting rules failed to justify incon-
sistencies with the CFTC's rules. Although the SEC admitted that it "has taken
into consideration comments received supporting harmonization of the CFTC's
rules for swap data repositories with the SDR Rules," the Commission re-
sponded to these comments by saying that it "believes that the final SDR Rules
are largely consistent with the rules adopted by the CFTC."134 In another rule-
making, the SEC again conceded that "it would be beneficial to harmonize, to
the extent practicable, the information required to be reported under Regula-
tion SBSR and under the CFTC's swap-reporting rules."' Nevertheless, the
SEC countered that "the flexibility" of its reporting rule "will facilitate harmo-
nization of reporting protocols and elements between the SEC and CFTC re-
porting regime."1 3 6 Notably, the SEC issued this cost-benefit analysis over three
years after the London Whale incident. Nevertheless, the SEC did not mention
that granting data repositories flexibility had prevented regulators from detect-
130. Id. at 1232-40.
131. Procedures To Establish Appropriate Minimum Block Sizes for Large Notional Off-Facility
Swaps and Block Trades, 78 Fed. Reg. 32,866, 32,897 (May 31, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
Pt. 43).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 32,915-27.
134. Security-Based Swap Data Repository Registration, Duties, and Core Principles, So Fed.
Reg. 14,438, 14,442 (Mar. 19, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 232, 240, 249). I should note
that the SEC did justify one divergence with the CFTC's rule - that swap data repositories
comply with generally accepted accounting principles. See id. at 14,585. However, the SEC
did not give any other reasons for this belief, despite the fact that considerable differences
persist.
135. Regulation SBSR-Reporting and Dissemination of Security-Based Swap Information, So





ing a systemically significant swap build-up. Nor did it explain how it would
detect potentially destabilizing swap positions given the likelihood that report-
ing inconsistencies would render swap data unusable.3
Granted, the SEC and the CFTC have publicly acknowledged that regulato-
ry inconsistencies render their regulations more expensive,' and they have in-
dependently recognized that they are required to consider the potential costs
and benefits whenever they regulate. For instance, the SEC has released a
"standard template""' to explain how it would measure costs and benefits
when promulgating rules under Dodd-Frank.14 0 The CFTC has also recently
indicated that it plans to take its cost-benefit mandate more seriously, entering
into a memorandum of understanding with the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to obtain "technical assistance .. . during the im-
plementation of [Dodd-Frank], particularly with respect to the consideration
of the costs and benefits of proposed and final rules."141 The SEC and CFTC
have also distributed internal guidance explaining how they should comply
with cost-benefit requirements. In March 2012, the SEC cited "[r]ecent court
decisions, reports of the U.S. Government Accountability Office ... and the
SEC's Office of Inspector General ... and Congressional inquiries" that had
"raised questions about ... the Commission's economic analysis in its rulemak-
ing."142 The SEC guidance noted that, "as SEC chairmen ha[d] informed Con-
gress since at least the early 198os- and as rulemaking releases since that time
reflect-the [SEC] considers potential costs and benefits as a matter of good
137. See id.
138. See sources cited supra note 121.
139. Memorandum from Dan M. Berkovitz, Gen. Counsel, CFTC & Jim Moser, Acting
Chief Economist, CFTC, to Rulemaking Teams, CFTC (Sept. 29, 2010), reprinted in Office
of the Inspector Gen., An Investigation Regarding Cost-Benefit Analyses Performed by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission in Connection with Rulemakings Undertaken Pursuant
to the Dodd-Frank Act, CFTC at Ex. i (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups
/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/oig investigation o41511.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z2QH
-FDFR].
140. Div. of Risk, Strategy & Fin. Innovation & Office of the Gen. Counsel, Current Guidance on
Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking, SEC (Mar. 16, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 Guidance],
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi-guidance-econanaly secrulemaking.pdf [http:/
/perma.cc/J3JH-6ULR].
141. Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs & CFTC, Memorandum of Understanding, WHITE HOUSE
1 (May 9, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/oira
cftc_mou_2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/XEK4-MGYK].
142. 2012 Guidance, supra note 140, at 1. The guidance directed the rulemaking staff to "quantify
those expected benefits and costs to the extent possible." Id. at 9.
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regulatory practice whenever it adopts rules."143 The SEC guidance directed
rulemaking staff to work with economists to analyze which costs and benefits a
rule might create, to quantify those that could be quantified, and to explain
why others could not feasibly be quantified.144
And yet these attempts to improve cost-benefit analysis have not persuaded
the agencies to coordinate their swaps rules, nor have they persuaded politi-
cians and economists that the agencies have begun to take their cost-benefit
obligations seriously. For example, the CFTC's approach to considering costs
and benefits under the standard template has come under heavy criticism, not
just from market participants complaining about particular rulemakings, but
also from economists,14 5 members of Congress, 14 6 and CFTC commissioners.
CFTC Commissioner Jill Sommers admitted, "The proposals we have issued
thus far contain cursory, boilerplate cost-benefit analysis sections in which we
have not attempted to quantify the costs because we are not required to do so
under the Commodity Exchange Act .... [W]e should most certainly attempt
to determine whether the costs outweigh the benefits."14 7 The Inspector Gen-
eral of the CFTC has even issued a report finding that the CFTC had adopted a
"one size fits all" approach and had not given sufficient regard to "addressing
idiosyncratic cost and benefit issues that were shaping each rule, and [were]
often addressed in the preamble."148
In sum, while the costs that duplicative regulations impose on industry par-
ticipants are serious, they are not the most significant problem with the current
143. Id. at 3.
144. Id. at 12.
145. Jacqueline McCabe, The Need for Improved Cost-Benefit Analysis of Dodd
-Frank Rulemaking, HARv. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May
12, 2012), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/05/12/the-need-for-improved-cost-benefit
-analysis-of-dodd-frank-rulemaking [http://perma.cc/X7U2-NW78] (finding that of 192
rules issued under Dodd-Frank, 142 had no quantified cost-benefit analysis, and 57 con-
tained no cost-benefit analysis at all).
146. Wall Street Reform: Oversight of Financial Stability and Consumer and Investor Protections:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 11 3 th Cong. 21 (2013)
(statement of Sen. Mike Crapo) (urging the heads of the major financial agencies to commit
to "act on GAO's recommendation to incorporate OMB's guidance on [CBA] into your pro-
posed and final rules [and] interpretive guidance").
147. Jill E. Sommers, Comm'r, CFTC, Remarks Before the Institute of International Bankers,
Annual Washington Conference (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Speeches
Testimony/opasommers-13 [http://perma.cc/CM94-VFUJ].
148. Office of the Inspector Gen., A Review of Cost-Benefit Analyses Performed by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission in Connection with Rulemakings Undertaken Pursuant to the Dodd-
Frank Act, CFTC 27 (June 3, 2011), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc




regime. As the London Whale incident shows, the inconsistent regulations
promulgated by the SEC and CFTC have made important data about the mar-
ket exposure of industry participants more opaque and less accessible to regula-
tors. The inconsistent regulations promulgated under Dodd-Frank have thus
undermined the law's goal of reducing systemic risk. Although the SEC and
CFTC have occasionally acknowledged the costs of these inconsistencies, to
date, they have not justified these costs in their rulemakings.
II. REGULATORY HARMONIZATION THROUGH COST-BENEFIT
MANDATES AND THE APA
Fortunately, cost-benefit mandates and the APA, both individually and in
tandem, require the SEC and CFTC to consider the effects that their rules will
have on market fragmentation and liquidity. The SEC and CFTC are statutorily
required to justify their rules and respond to proposals that they harmonize
their swaps regulations.149 If the SEC and CFTC cannot provide a reasoned re-
sponse to comments requesting that they harmonize swaps rules, then they
must adjust their rules until they can offer a justification. Granted, neither cost-
benefit mandates nor the APA have yet been used to encourage agencies to co-
ordinate.`0 But, as this Part shows, judicial review of interagency coordination
follows logically from the current doctrine. This Part argues that judicial review
of the agencies' unwillingness to coordinate would not only force the Commis-
sions to offer public justifications for their refusal to harmonize swaps regula-
tions, but that the exercise of offering reasons for regulatory divergences would
itself induce the agencies to work together.
A. APA Requirements
Under the APA, an agency's failure to consider alternative regulations
should be considered an illegal exercise of authority."' Section 553 of the APA
149. See infra Section II.B.
150. To date, no one has challenged the swap-reporting rules on the ground that the agencies'
failure to harmonize violates the APA and their cost-benefit mandates. One case did chal-
lenge a recent CFTC rule for failure to harmonize with the SEC regime, but that challenge
failed because the CFTC had given a fairly robust explanation of its decision to enact differ-
ent regulations and had issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to harmonize its rule. See
Inv. Co. Inst. v. CFTC, 720 F.3d 3 7 0 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
151. I offer a simplified story of the development of the APA. As others have shown, courts did
not always engage in searching review of administrative actions. See Merrick B. Garland, De-
regulation andJudicial Review, 98 HARv. L. REv. 505, 525 (1985) (discussing the birth and the
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requires agencies to describe proposed rules in a general notice of proposed
rulemaking,152 to give third parties the opportunity to comment on proposed
rules,' and to respond to relevant comments in a "concise general statement
of their basis and purpose."154
These requirements were famously articulated in Motor Vehicle Manufactur-
ers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance.' In State Farm, the Su-
preme Court held that the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) acted arbitrarily and capriciously in revoking Standard 208, which
required automakers to include passive restraints in all new cars. 15 6 While the
agency had explained why car companies should not be required to install one
kind of passive restraint- ignition interlocks-it gave no consideration to an
alternative restraint mechanism that it had already proposed: mandating the
use of airbags. According to the majority, because the agency "entirely failed to
consider" this "important aspect of the problem," its action was considered ar-
bitrary and capricious under the APA.1s"
Indeed, a long line of administrative law cases has established that section
553 requires agencies to respond to comments when implementing new
rules.' Failure to do so renders agency action arbitrary and capricious, and
therefore invalid. As the D.C. Circuit explained in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,
an agency "has an obligation to make its views known to the public in a con-
crete and focused form so as to make criticism or formulation of alternatives
possible." 9
The Supreme Court explained how courts should evaluate agency justifica-
tions for major administrative actions in Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe. According to the majority, courts should "consider whether the deci-
sion was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has
development of the hard look doctrine); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in
Hard Look Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 14-29 (2009).
152. 5 U.S.C. § 55 3 (b)( 3) (2012).
153. Id. § 553(c).
154. Id.
155. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
156. Id. at 43.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., St. James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460, 1470 (7 th Cir. 1985); Ala. Power Co. v.
Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that "the opportunity to comment is meaningless unless the agency
responds to significant points raised by the public").




been a clear error of judgment." 6 0 The court went on to clarify that,
"[a] ithough this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ulti-
mate standard of review is a narrow one."161 In other words, the courts police
agency justifications but are prohibited from "substitut[ing their] judgment for
that of the agency." 62 A court that finds an APA violation can remand the rule
back to the agency for reconsideration.16 3
The SEC's and CFTC's inconsistent regulation of swaps would fail this
standard of APA review. As discussed in Part I, regulatory inconsistencies create
burdensome costs for market participants and render the rules less effective at
reducing systemic risk. Moreover, the industry has already laid the groundwork
for APA review through its comments, which repeatedly urge the agencies to
harmonize their swaps regulations.164 If the rules were challenged under the
APA, a court should find that the rules were not "based on a consideration of
the relevant factors.1 65
Critically, as with any other rulemaking challenge under the APA, a court
should remand the rule back to the respective agencies, who would then have
the opportunity to resubmit the rules based on additional fact finding. 166 Thus,
the reviewing court would not order the agencies to collaborate or otherwise
oversee agency efforts to harmonize their rules. Instead, it would merely ensure
that the SEC and CFTC have provided reasons for promulgating inconsistent
swaps rules. If the reasons passed the APA's standard of arbitrary and capri-
cious review, the rules would withstand judicial scrutiny. If not, the SEC and
CFTC would have to go back to the drawing board or harmonize their regula-
tions. In other words, the court would be constrained to remanding -not in-
validating -rules that are insufficiently justified.




163. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) ("When the BIA has not spoken on 'a
matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands, our ordinary rule is to remand to
'giv[e] the BIA the opportunity to address the matter in the first instance in light of its own
expertise."' (quoting INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17 (2002) (per curiam))); see also 3
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 18.1 (5th ed. 2010) ("In most cases,
successful prosecution of a [petition for] review ... yields ... a judicial decision setting
aside the agency action and remanding the proceeding for further agency action not incon-
sistent with the decision of the reviewing court.").
164. See discussion supra Section I.B.
165. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
166. See PIERCE, supra note 163, § 18.1.
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B. Cost-Benefit Mandates
Like the APA, cost-benefit requirements in the CFTC's and SEC's organic
statutes require the agencies to consider alternative regulatory approaches and
to justify their proposed rules against these alternatives. There are three princi-
ple differences between cost-benefit analysis and the APA. First, cost-benefit
analysis-but not the APA-explicitly requires agencies to consider the eco-
nomic consequences of a rule as an additional factor when justifying the rule.
Cost-benefit mandates therefore force agencies to go through not only the pro-
cedural requirement of considering relevant facts, but also the substantive re-
quirement of showing that the benefits of an action outweigh the costs. Alt-
hough courts still defer to agencies' substantive judgments about the net
benefits of a rule, cost-benefit mandates open up room for judges to ensure
that agencies give reasoned justifications of the societal usefulness of new
rules. 1 6 7 Second, cost-benefit mandates ask agencies to consider less costly al-
ternatives even if no one raised those alternatives during notice and com-
ment. 168 Third, an agency must perform cost-benefit analysis only when a spe-
cific substantive statute requires that the agency conduct such an analysis. It is
therefore not required of every administrative agency.
The authorizing statutes of both the SEC 1 69 and the CFTC1 70 require the
agencies to engage in cost-benefit analysis when promulgating new rules. The
167. In American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3 d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010), for
example, the court found that although the SEC's interpretation of a statute was reasonable
under Chevron, it was necessarily arbitrary and capricious because the agency's analysis of
the rule's benefits was unsound. The court therefore assumed that the cost-benefit mandate
makes an agency's substantive judgments about the merits of a proposed action an appro-
priate subject of judicial review. This is also the approach followed in Business Roundrable v.
SEC, 647 F.3 d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 4 12 F.3 d 133 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
168. Note, however, that interested parties have repeatedly mentioned the costs imposed by in-
consistent regulations during the comment period of derivatives rules. See supra Section I.B.
169. See Registration of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77 Fed. Reg. 2613 (Jan. 19,
2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 23, 170) ("The goal of this legislation was to reduce risk,
increase transparency, and promote market integrity within the financial system. . . .").
170. The CFTC's cost-benefit mandate has a similar origin. In 2000, Congress amended the
CFTC's organic statute to require the CFTC to consider the economic consequences of new
rules. The Commodity Exchange Act, however, is more precise in imposing a cost-benefit
mandate. The Commodity Exchange Act states that the CFTC "shall consider the costs and
benefits of the action of the Commission,' and it expressly specifies that the CFTC must
consider certain costs and benefits, including a rule's effects on "efficiency, competitiveness,
and financial integrity of futures markets." 7 U.S.C. § 19(a) (2012). As with the SEC, courts




Commissions must therefore show that a proposed rule outweighs possible al-
ternatives, regardless of whether a third party has suggested the alternative in a
comment. In interpreting the agencies' cost-benefit mandates, courts have em-
phasized that the agencies must justify their regulations not in relation to a hy-
pothetical state in which other agencies do not exist, but in relation to the ex-
isting regulatory landscape. Thus, the SEC's and CFTC's failure to respond to
comments requesting regulatory harmonization constitutes an arbitrary exer-
cise of each agency's regulatory authority in a way that independently violates
each agency's statutory cost-benefit mandate.
The D.C. Circuit has elaborated the SEC's cost-benefit requirements in a
series of cases beginning in the early 2000S. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC17 1 was
the first case to interpret section 8oa of the Investment Company Act, which
instructs the Commission to consider the effect of a new rule on efficiency. 172 In
Chamber of Commerce, the D.C. Circuit remanded an SEC rule requiring mutual
funds' boards of directors to have independent chairmen and to have at least
seventy-five percent of their directors be "independent" of management.1 73 The
D.C. Circuit held that the rule failed to comply with the SEC's cost-benefit re-
quirement for two reasons. First, the SEC did not quantify the costs of requir-
ing seventy-five percent independent directors.174 The court held that the SEC
should have attempted to quantify this cost even though the Commission did
not know whether boards would respond to the rule by increasing the number
proposed regulations. See Inv. Co. Inst. v. CFTC, 891 F. Supp. 2d 162, 215 (D.D.C. 2012)
("While the CFTC did not calculate the costs of the Final Rule down to the dollar-and-cent,
it reasonably considered the costs and benefits of the Final Rule, and decided that the bene-
fits outweigh the costs."). And the CFTC has acknowledged that it must carefully consider
costs when adopting new rules. In September 2010, the CFTC's General Counsel and Acting
Chief Economist distributed a memorandum noting that, while the CFTC's authorizing
statute does not require it to quantify all costs, it does require the CFTC to consider costs
and benefits. The memorandum also noted that recent court decisions had shown that
courts will perform searching review to ensure that the Commission has taken this require-
ment seriously. See Memorandum from Dan M. Berkovitz & Jim Moser to Rulemaking
Teams, supra note 139.
412 F.;d at 140-42.
15 U.S.C. § Soa-2(c) (2012). This amendment was made in the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act, see Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 1o6(c), 110 Stat. 3416, 3425 (1996), which add-
ed identical requirements to the other major federal securities laws - the Securities Act of
1933, see id. § 1o6(a), 110 Stat. at 3424 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 b(b) (2012)), and the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934, see id. § 1o6(b), 110 Stat. at 3424-25 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
7 8c(f) (2012)).
Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3 d at 136.
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of directors on boards or by replacing incumbent directors. 17s Second, the SEC
failed to justify the requirement that these boards have an independent chair.1 76
The SEC recognized that newly independent chairs might hire staff, but it de-
clined to quantify those costs because it stated that it could not predict how
many chairs would hire staff, or how many staff members each chair would
hire. Again, the court found this excuse unavailing.1 7 7
According to the majority, these deficiencies constituted not only a violation
of the SEC's specific cost-benefit mandate, but also a violation of the APA. The
court held that the SEC violated the APA by failing to consider a proposal
raised in comment letters that suggested that mutual funds be required to dis-
close publicly whether they had independent chairs.1 7 ' The court noted that the
SEC justified its decision not to consider this alternative on the ground that the
SEC had no obligation to consider every alternative raised, that it did consider
other alternatives, and that Congress in the Investment Company Act1 7 9 itself
had not relied on disclosure alone to police conflicts of interest in funds. 10 To
this, the court responded, " [T]hat the Congress required more than disclosure
with respect to some matters governed by the [Investment Company Act] does
not mean it deemed disclosure insufficient with respect to all such matters."8
Furthermore, because the SEC did not consider whether an alternative reg-
ulatory regime would be equally effective and less costly, the Commission
"fail [ed] adequately to consider the costs that mutual funds would incur in or-
der to comply with the conditions."18 2 Chamber of Commerce therefore inter-
preted the Securities Exchange Act's requirement that the SEC "consider" a
rule's effects on "efficiency"' to imply a robust cost-benefit mandate. Pursuant
to this mandate, the SEC must consider not only whether the net benefits are
economically justified compared to the status quo, but also whether the costs
are justified when compared to less expensive alternatives.
175. The court said that the SEC could have determined "the range within which a fund's cost of
compliance [would] fall." Id. at 143.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 144.
178. Id.
179. 15 U.S.C. §. Soa-1 to 8oa-64 (2012).
18o. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3 d at 144.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 136.





Since Chamber of Commerce, the D.C. Circuit has invalidated a number of
financial regulatory actions for failing to satisfy the APA and the agencies' cost-
benefit mandates.184 Concerns about the adequacy of financial regulators' cost-
benefit analyses intensified after the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Business
Roundtable v. SEC,1 ss which overturned the SEC's "proxy access" rule. The
proxy access rule made it easier for shareholders to nominate outside candi-
dates to become directors of publicly traded companies.186 Calling the SEC's
statutory mandate to perform cost-benefit analysis a "unique obligation," the
court held that the agency's "failure to 'apprise itself- and hence the public and
the Congress -of the economic consequences of a proposed regulation' ma[de]
promulgation of the rule arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with
law.""' As in Chamber of Commerce, the SEC's failure to consider certain costs
triggered violations of both the APA and of the Commission's cost-benefit
184. For instance, the D.C. Circuit invalidated a rule requiring hedge fund advisors to register
under the Investment Advisors Act, see Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3 d 873 (D.C. Cir. 20o6),
a rule exempting broker-dealers from registration requirements under the Investment Advi-
sors Act, see Fin. Planning Ass'n v. SEC, 482 F.3 d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007), an order affirming
expulsion of a member of the National Association of Securities Dealers, see PAZ Sec., Inc. v.
SEC, 494 F.3 d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and a rule subjecting a new class of market-linked an-
nuities to securities regulations governed by the SEC, see Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v.
SEC, 613 F.3 d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Since Chamber of Commerce, only one decision has up-
held an SEC regulation-National Ass'n of Manufacturers v. SEC. See 748 F.3 d 359 (D.C. Cir.
2014), overruled by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir 2014), and
adhered to on reh'g, 800 F.3 d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
The D.C. Circuit and D.C. District Court have made clear that CFTC rules are subject
to the same judicial scrutiny as SEC rules, but they have generally dismissed challenges to
CFTC rules on technical and procedural grounds. The court recently held that a CFTC regu-
lation satisfied the APA and met its cost-benefit mandates in Investment Co. Institute v.
CFTC, 720 F.3 d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2013). A challenge to the CFTC's rulemaking establishing
standards for calculating margin requirements for cleared swaps was dismissed for lack of
standing. Bloomberg L.P. v. CFTC, 949 F. Supp. 2d 91 (D.D.C. 2013). The challenge to the
CFTC's cross-border guidance in Securities Industry & Financial Markets Ass'n v. CFTC, 67 F.
Supp. 3d 373 (D.D.C. 2014), was also decided on the technical ground that the provision in
question constituted guidance and so was not subject to notice and comment. In another
case, the plaintiffs challenged the Commission's approval of a rule of the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange that requires the reporting of cleared swaps to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's
swap data repository and the self-certification of a similar rule by ICE Clear Credit, another
derivative clearing organization. See DTCC Data Repository (U.S.) LLC v. CFTC, 25 F.
Supp. 3d 9 (D.D.C. 2014). The court held that the self-certification of the ICE rule was not a
reviewable final agency action, but denied the motion with respect to two of the plaintiffs'
claims regarding CFTC's approval of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's rule. Id.
185. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
186. Id. at 1147.
187. Id. at 1148 (citing Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144).
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mandate. In language that is relevant to the regulation of swaps, the court ob-
served that "the Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed the
costs and benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or
to explain why those costs could not be quantified; neglected to support its
predictive judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to respond to substantial
problems raised by commenters.""'
Though not discussed as frequently as Chamber of Commerce or Business
Roundtable, the case most germane to the financial regulators' swaps regula-
tions is a 2010 opinion decided by the D.C. Circuit. The case, American Equity
Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC,"' explicitly held that the SEC could not
determine whether an annuities regulation would be effective without first con-
sidering how the rule would interact with existing state annuities laws. 10 Spe-
cifically, the question in American Equity was whether an SEC regulation was
warranted given the fact that state law already provided a "baseline level of
price transparency and information disclosure.""' According to the court, the
SEC's failure to show that its rule would improve the existing state law regime
constituted a violation of its cost-benefit mandate. The court further held that
the SEC's failure triggered an APA violation as well: "The SEC's failure to ana-
lyze the efficiency of the existing state law regime renders arbitrary and capri-
cious the SEC's judgment that applying federal securities law would increase
efficiency."192 American Equity therefore established that the existing regulatory
landscape can be a relevant fact in APA and cost-benefit analysis.
American Equity was unique in the recent line of D.C. Circuit cases over-
turning SEC rules for inadequate cost-benefit analysis."' While most of these
188. Id. at 1148-49.
189. 613 F.3 d at 178-79.
190. An annuity is a financial product in which an individual agrees to pay funds to a financial
institution, which, at a later point in time, will make periodic payments to the individual.
See Annuities, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/annuity.htm [http://perma.cc/US5P
-WJN4].
191. 613 F.3d at 178.
192. Id. at 179.
193. The SEC's cost-benefit requirement comes from a 1996 bill in which Congress amended the
SEC's organic statutes to require the Commission to consider whether proposed regulatory
actions would "promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation." National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106, 110 Stat. 3416, 3424 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7 7b(b) (2012)) ("Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the
Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an
action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider,
in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, compe-




cost-benefit cases criticize the Commission for insufficiently justifying the costs
and benefits of its own proposed rules,194 American Equity criticized the SEC
for failing to consider whether another regulatory regime rendered an SEC rule
redundant. As the court explained, "The SEC could not accurately assess any
potential increase or decrease in competition ... because it did not assess the
baseline level of price transparency and information disclosure under state
law."195
American Equity is remarkable for at least three reasons. First, it is one of
very few cases to acknowledge that in certain situations, the effectiveness of a
regulation depends on how that regulation interacts with the regulatory appa-
ratus as a whole.1 96 Second, it suggests a role for the judiciary -namely, as the
regulatory harmonizer of last resort-that a number of scholars have criticized
on the ground that judges are ill-equipped to supervise administrative agen-
cies.' 9 And third, the court viewed this supervisory function as a logical and
unremarkable extension of the court's duty to ensure that agencies offer public-
ly accessible reasons to justify new rules.
§ 7 8c(f) (2012)) (same language). The SEC's cost-benefit mandate comes from the D.C.
Circuit's interpretation of these statutes. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3 d 1144,
1148-49 (D.C. Cit. 2011) (striking down proxy access Iule because the SEC "inconsistently
and opportunistically framed the Costs and beiefits of the rule"); Am. Equity, 613 F.3 d at
167-68 (striking down an SEC fixed indexed annuities rule because "the SEC failed to
properly consider the effect of the rule upon efficiency, competition, and capital formation");
Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3 d 133, 136 (D.C. Cit. 2005) (requiring the SEC to
conduct cost-benefit analysis based on the statutory requirement that the SEC consider
"efficiency" as one of a number of factors in rulemaking).
194. See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3 d at 1144; Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3 d at 136.
195. Am. Equity, 613 F.3 d at 178.
196. Of course, courts have previously looked at the existing regulatory environment to deter-
mine the validity of a proposed rule. For example, the Supreme Court famously invalidated
an FDA rule classifying tobacco as a drug on the ground that related statutes and regulations
suggested that the FDA lacked jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. See FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). Similarly, the Supreme Court has cited
the states' historical role in regulating the medical profession as evidence that the Attorney
General did not have authority to prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated drugs that
might be used in physician-assisted suicide. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (20o6).
But these cases did not determine how regulations interacted in situations of overlapping
and duplicative jurisdiction, but rather determined whether an agency had authority to
regulate a certain activity at all.
197. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, in WESTERN RIGHTS? POsTcOMMUNIST APPLI-
CATION 229 (AndrAs Saj6 ed., 1996) ("Courts lack the tools of a bureaucracy. They cannot
create government programs."); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 25, at 1137 ("Although courts
could in theory incentivize interagency coordination with greater deference, we argue that
this shift is neither likely to occur under current doctrine nor warranted, and that the main
drivers of coordination should be the legislative and executive branches.").
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The underlying facts of American Equity ensured that it would not prompt
regulatory harmonization. This is because the question in that case was wheth-
er the SEC rule was warranted in the first place. The SEC sought to regulate an
activity that was already subject to robust disclosure requirements under state
law. Appellants sought to show that the SEC rule should be invalidated. Swaps
are different. As Part I explained, the SEC and the CFTC oversee different
kinds of swaps, and there is no question that the agencies are each statutorily
required to issue regulations governing the swaps under their jurisdiction.19
The question is therefore not whether one of the agencies has jurisdiction over
swaps, but whether the SEC and CFTC considered how their rules would in-
teract. As the next Part shows, applying the logic of American Equity to the
SEC's and CFTC's swaps rules would create a strong incentive for the agencies
to collaborate and reduce regulatory inconsistencies.
Three years after American Equity, the D.C. Circuit decided Investment Co.
Institute v. CFTC,199 which also considered remanding a financial regulation for
failure to consider how the rule would interact with another financial regula-
tor's rule. Investment Co. Institute considered the legality of a CFTC rule requir-
ing certain companies that had previously been exempt from CFTC registra-
tion requirements to register with the CFTC. Appellants argued that the rule
should be invalidated because the CFTC "ignored existing SEC regulations
that could provide the necessary information about investment companies' ac-
tivities in derivatives markets" and therefore failed to consider whether "exist-
ing regulations made its proposed regulation unnecessary."2 00 As in American
Equity, the question was whether the agency had given adequate consideration
to the existing regulatory apparatus. In this case, however, the court found that
the CFTC had complied with the APA and its cost-benefit mandate. The court
distinguished the case from Business Roundtable and American Equity on the
grounds that the CFTC had consulted with the SEC and "surveyed the existing
regulatory landscape and .. . found that its registration and reporting require-
ments could fill gaps in current regulations."20 1 The court also drew attention
to the fact that the CFTC planned to reduce inconsistencies between its rule
and the SEC's rule, explaining that the CFTC had "issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking for a harmonization, the entire purpose of which was to synchro-
nize SEC and CFTC regulations, further distinguishing this case [Investment
198. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 721, 761, 124 Stat. 1376, 1658-72, 1754-59 (2010) (cod-
ified at 15 U.S.C. § 8302).
199. 720 F.3 d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
200. Id. at 373.




Co. Institute] from American Equity and Business Roundtable."202 Thus, the
CFTC satisfied its cost-benefit requirement because it considered how its rule
would interact with SEC rules, and because it planned to make further efforts
to harmonize its rules and reduce the costs of regulatory inconsistencies.
Investment Co. Institute considered another question that is relevant for SEC
and CFTC swaps regulations. Specifically, the court determined that a regula-
tor must consider how its rule will interact with the existing regulatory appa-
ratus - not how the rule would affect a hypothetical regulatory regime that
might develop after another regulator acts at a later date. In Investment Co. In-
stitute, appellants argued that the CFTC could not measure the costs and bene-
fits of the rule because the CFTC had decided to perform a "multi-step rule-
making with some regulations becoming final only after harmonization with
SEC regulations."20 3 According to appellants, the CFTC's failure to delay im-
plementation until it had coordinated with the SEC introduced an unjustifiable
level of uncertainty and allowed the CFTC to "count[] benefits that may not
materialize ... while ignoring costs that may result from that rule."204 Appel-
lants therefore urged the CFTC to adopt its rules only after harmonizing its
rule with the SEC's rule. The D.C. Circuit disagreed. According to the court,
the CFTC had "no obligation to consider hypothetical costs that may never
arise."20 5 The implication of the court's opinion is that the court will not force
agencies to modify the timing and substance of a new rule based on the likeli-
hood that future rules will determine the efficacy of the currently proposed
rule. Instead, courts should ensure that agencies have considered the existing
regulatory landscape.
Investment Co. Institute therefore seems to favor the first mover when agen-
cies regulate in shared administrative spaces. In the case of swaps, the CFTC
may benefit from having enacted a number of swap-reporting rules before the
SEC. While the CFTC need not consider costs and benefits that may or may
not materialize, the SEC, by virtue of enacting swaps rules after the CFTC,
must consider the regulatory apparatus that has emerged as a result of the
CFTC's swaps rules. As a result, Investment Co. Institute suggests that the SEC
must either make its rules consistent with the CFTC's rules or explain why it
has chosen to take a different path. The CFTC has since amended its reporting




205. Id. at 375.
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its reporting rules,206 the CFTC would have to consider how these modifica-
tions affect the SEC's rules.
As this Part has shown, both the APA and the specific statutory cost-benefit
mandates of the SEC and CFTC make clear that these agencies are legally re-
quired to consider the broader regulatory environment into which a proposed
rule will enter. Regardless of whether an agency must engage in cost-benefit
analysis, the agency's failure to consider alternative regulations proposed dur-
ing notice and comment triggers an APA violation that justifies judicial remand
of the rule. If an agency is also governed by a cost-benefit mandate, reviewing
courts can engage in a more searching review of the agency's justification of the
social utility of the rule, regardless of whether a specific regulatory alternative
has been raised in comments.
III. HOW JUDICIAL REVIEW CAN FOSTER INTERAGENCY
COLLABORATION
The previous Section explained that the APA and the SEC's and CFTC's
cost-benefit mandates require the agencies to consider how a new rule will in-
teract with the existing regulatory apparatus. This Part explains how judicial
enforcement of that standard would incentivize interagency collaboration. Crit-
ically, courts would not order agencies to act in a certain way, or even to collab-
orate. Instead, they would simply enforce well-established principles of admin-
istrative law that were articulated in iconic cases like State Farm and Overton
Park.
This Part also clarifies how judicial review might work in tandem with ex-
ecutive and legislative attempts to facilitate agency collaboration. I argue that
judicial review need not come at the expense of legislative or executive attempts
to induce regulatory harmonization. Rather, judicial review would impose a
baseline reason-giving requirement that would apply regardless of whether the
executive or the legislature also sought to require collaboration. This Section
shows that, in certain cases, judicial review may even prove more desirable than
executive or legislative intervention. While executive or legislative interven-
tions involve potentially burdensome intrusions from outside parties, judicial
review would empower agencies by granting them broad discretion to decide
how best to mediate the costs of inconsistencies.
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As Part II discussed, established doctrine permits courts to determine
whether an agency has given adequate consideration to the ways a rule will in-
teract with the existing regulatory apparatus. The analysis in this Part shows
that applying that principle to swaps would encourage the SEC and CFTC to
reduce inconsistencies and collaborate when necessary.
The basic point is that by forcing the SEC and CFTC to engage in a more
searching analysis of the costs of inconsistent swaps rules, courts would create
a powerful incentive for the agencies to harmonize their regulations. Frederick
Schauer has shown that the act of giving reasons can discipline the institutions
that give those reasons. According to Schauer, "when institutional designers
have grounds for believing that decisions will systematically be the product of
bias, self-interest, insufficient reflection, or simply excess haste, requiring deci-
sionmakers to give reasons may counteract some of these tendencies."207 On
this view, the act of giving reasons can itself discipline agency action by limit-
ing the scope of available discretion. A cynic may criticize agency decisions for
being rash or self-interested, but so long as agencies give publicly accessible
reasons, administrative choices cannot be justified solely on self-serving
grounds. Schauer further notes that "[a] reason-giving mandate will also drive
out illegitimate reasons when they are the only plausible explanation for par-
ticular outcomes." 20 8
One can understand recent cost-benefit cases as seeking to realize this ideal
of reasoned administration. The D.C. Circuit's case law leaves little doubt
about the SEC's and CFTC's cost-benefit mandates: agencies must consider
whether alternative regulations would better achieve a statute's objectives at a
lower cost. The law is emphatic, and there is no reason to think that a proposal
asking the agencies to consider how their rules interact is any different from
the American Equity requirement that the SEC consider how its rule fits into the
state-governed insurance regulatory regime. 2 09
207. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REv. 633, 657-58 (2013); see also Jon Elster,
Deliberation and Constitution Making, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 97, loo (Jon Elster ed.,
1998) ("The mere fact that an assembly of individuals defines its task as that of deliberation
rather than mere force-based bargaining exercises a powerful influence on the proposals and
arguments that can be made."); id. at 104 ("Because there are powerful norms against naked
appeals to interest or prejudice, speakers have to justify their proposals by the public inter-
est.").
208. Schauer, supra note 207, at 657-58.
209. Id.
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I should note that this case law is far from uncontroversial. Business
Roundtable was criticized for imposing an unrealistic burden on regulatory
agencies.2 10 Academic commentary focused on the court's willingness to force
the SEC to do the impossible and provide an accurate quantitative assessment
of the rule's costs.2 11 Specifically, scholars criticized Judge Ginsburg's admoni-
tion that the SEC's cost-benefit assessments "had no basis beyond mere specu-
lation" because the agency failed "to estimate and quantify the costs it expected
companies to incur .. . ."212
However, one need not adopt Judge Ginsburg's claim that cost-benefit
analysis requires that agencies quantify costs to conclude that the SEC's and
CFTC's failure to account for each other's swaps regulations has jeopardized
the lawfulness of their rules. In fact, the SEC and CFTC swaps regulations
would fail even a relaxed version of Business Roundtable. Part II showed that
current law requires agencies to give reasons for costly inconsistencies. To satis-
fy this requirement, the agencies are obligated to consider the rules' effects on
the current regulatory regime, including their marginal benefits and costs in
light of existing regulations. They have failed to do this. Thus, if someone chal-
lenged their swaps rules, it is in a court's legal power to remand the agencies'
swaps rules for reconsideration. If the Commissions cannot give a plausible ex-
planation for an inconsistency, they would have to harmonize their rules. As a
result, the act of requiring reasons would itself prompt greater interagency col-
laboration.
210. Coates, supra note 23, at 917-20; James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has
No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit's Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 1811, 1813, 1824 (2012) ("[T]he level of review invoked by the D.C. Circuit in Business
Roundtable and its earlier decisions is dramatically inconsistent with the standard enacted by
Congress . . . . [T]he Review Standard [that is, the requirement that the SEC consider the
effect of a rule upon efficiency, competition, and capital formation] does not explicitly re-
quire the SEC to specify the costs of any proposed rule, to engage in rigorous analysis, or
even to engage in cost-benefit analysis . . . . [I]t seems unlikely that the Review Standard
was truly designed to establish more than a thoughtful analysis of the proposed rule's poten-
tial effects."); Gordon, supra note 24, at 370-71; see also Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational
Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 289, 316 (2013) ("The court ap-
pears to have applied a new burden of proof- the opposite of deference . . . ." (citations
omitted)). A report from Better Markets asserted that the D.C. Circuit in Business Roundtable
used cost-benefit analysis to "repeatedly substitute[] its own judgment for that of the agen-
cy." Setting the Record Straight on Cost-Benefit Analysis and Financial Reform at the SEC, BET-
TER MKTS. 50 (July 30, 2012), http://www.bettermarkets.com/sites/default/files/Setting
%2oThe%2oRecord%20Straight.pdf [http://perma.cc/82CT-FSP8].
211. See sources cited supra note 210.




This approach is precisely the standard Judge Ginsburg applied in Business
Roundtable. The debate about whether it is appropriate to force agencies to
quantify their cost-benefit analyses elides a more general point, which is that
the D.C. Circuit struck down the SEC's proxy rules because the agency had
failed to "weigh the rule [s'1 costs and benefits," particularly as they related to
the existing regulatory environment. And "[w] ithout th [at] crucial datum, the
Commission ha[d] no way of knowing whether" its swaps rules would have a
"net benefit."213
Similarly, in the case of swaps, the SEC and CFTC have failed to account
for a "crucial datum," which is whether their rules will be effective given the
regulatory environment created by Dodd-Frank. Without that piece of infor-
mation, the agencies have no way of knowing if their rules will be effective.
Thus, when considering an obviously inconsistent regulation, the SEC and
CFTC must provide some justification for the inconsistencies. As discussed in
Part I, neither agency has done so in more than a cursory manner, even when
confronted with relevant comments from the industry.2 14 The agencies have
neither "explain[ed] why those costs could not be quantified," nor have they
"respond[ed] to substantial problems raised by commenters."2 15 In light of
State Farm, Business Roundtable, and American Equity, these deficiencies likely
violate the APA and the agencies' statutory cost-benefit mandates. If the agen-
cies continue to be unable to justify unilateral action, they have failed to justify
the incremental costs of regulatory inconsistencies and must adopt the pro-
posed alternative and harmonize their rules.
B. Why Judges?
Scholars have generally argued that the executive and the legislative
branches are better suited than the judiciary to foster interagency collaboration.
Rather than claim that courts do not have the legal authority to force agencies
to work together, scholars who adopt this position argue that courts are poorly
equipped to induce interagency collaboration. In a recent article describing the
difficulties of overlapping swap jurisdiction, Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi argue
that Congress and the President are best able to promote interagency collabora-
tion: "Although courts could in theory incentivize interagency coordination
with greater deference . . . this shift is neither likely to occur under current doc-
213. Id. at 1153 (citation omitted).
214. See discussion supra Part I.
215. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149.
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trine nor warranted ... the main drivers of coordination should be the legisla-
tive and executive branches."2 16
Freeman and Rossi thus regard the President and Congress, but not the
courts, as possessing powerful tools that can be used to motivate agencies to
coordinate. They suggest that the Financial Stability Oversight Committee
(FSOC) and, to a lesser extent, OIRA, are best equipped to regulate financial
transactions.217 After all, FSOC was established in part to facilitate coordina-
tion among the financial regulators,218 and section 112 of Dodd-Frank directs
FSOC to monitor and respond to emerging risks to the stability of the U.S. fi-
nancial system, including risks arising from the swaps market. To this end,
Dodd-Frank instructs the Committee to "facilitate information sharing and co-
ordination among the member [and other] agencies"; "identify" potentially
perilous "gaps in regulation"; "identify systemically important financial market
utilities and payment, clearing, and settlement activities"; recommend that
member financial regulators impose certain "standards and safeguards"; and
provide a forum for examining changes in markets and regulation and under-
taking member dispute resolution.2 19 Similarly, Executive Order 12,866 pro-
vides that significant regulatory actions must be submitted to OIRA for re-
view.22
But Freeman and Rossi overlook the fact that, as a practical matter, execu-
tive and legislative efforts to foster interagency collaboration may be poor sub-
stitutes for judicial review because such efforts have often produced disap-
pointing results. To date, FSOC has not participated in the swaps rulemaking
process.2 2 1 In fact, in November 2011, the GAO found that the agency had
played only a limited role in providing coordination among its members, which
216. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 25, at 1137.
217. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Structure of the Administrative State:
The Case of Financial Services Regulation 27 (N.Y. Univ. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Papers, Paper No. 554, 2016), http://sr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1556&context
=nyu plltwp [http://perma.cc/HG 7 R-YYUZ] (defending the view that FSOC and OIRA
should use cost-benefit analysis to discipline agencies and serve a coordinating role).
218. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 112(1)(e), 124 Stat. 1367, 1395 (2010).
219. 12 U.S.C. § 5322 (2012).
220. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).
221. See Davis Polk Regulatory Tracker, DAVIS POLK, http://www.regulatorytracker.com/regtracker
[http://perma.cc/YH8T-QDQE]. All of the swaps rules have been promulgated by the SEC
or the CFTC, and the vast majority of these rules do not even mention FSOC. See supra




include the SEC and CFTC.222 The report also noted that the coordination
tools that FSOC had developed were of "limited usefulness"223 and recom-
mended that FSOC "establish formal coordination policies."224 Although FSOC
broadly agreed with the report's conclusions,225 a GAO report from September
2012 found that the agency had failed to enact meaningful reforms.22 6 The re-
port reiterated that FSOC should create "formal collaboration and coordination
policies."227 Despite these continued admonitions, swaps rules remain bifurcat-
ed. In September 2014, the GAO reiterated that FSOC has "not adopt[ed] prac-
tices to coordinate rulemaking across member agencies . ."228
Nor has OIRA fared any better. OIRA has made the CFTC's cost-benefit
analyses longer, but it has not prompted the CFTC to consider how its regula-
tions will interact with the SEC's rules. This failure may be because the SEC
has not worked as closely with OIRA, or it may result from OIRA's lack of ex-
pertise in financial regulation. As Freeman and Rossi point out, " [I]t is not
clear that OIRA, as currently constituted, is optimally positioned to sponsor
coordination efforts that depend heavily on matters of legal interpretation or on
substantive policy considerations beyond economic efficiency."2 29 This concern
likely applies to OIRA's expertise with respect to the swaps market. And while
the agreement between OIRA and the CFTC has generated more robust cost-
benefit analyses, it has not prompted the CFTC to coordinate with the SEC or
to consider the effects of inconsistent regulations.
Thus, not only are judges empowered to enforce coordination, but in many
cases, they are also the most viable option for increasing agency collaboration.
Further, as a doctrinal matter, if neither OIRA nor FSOC succeeds in forcing
222. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-1 5 1, DODD-FRANK ACT REGULATION: IMPLE-
MENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND COORDINATION 26 (2011),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/59o/586210.pdf [http://perma.cc/DR4KC-92GT].
223. Id. at 27.
224. Id. at 39.
225. Letter from Amias Gerety, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Office of Fin. Stability Oversight Council,
to A. Nicole Clowers, Dir., Fin. Mkts. & Cmty. Inv., U.S. Gov't Accountability Office (Oct.
28, 2010), reprinted in U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 222, at lo5-o6.
226. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-866, FINANCIAL STABILITY: NEW COUNCIL AND
RESEARCH OFFICE SHOULD STRENGTHEN THE ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY OF THEIR
DECISIONS (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/65o/648o64.pdf [http://perma.cc/QP3A
-M62H].
227. Id. at 55.
228. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-8 7 3T, FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUN-
CIL: STATUS OF EFFORTS To IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND COLLABORATION
(2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665851.pdf [http://perma.cc/5NGZ-B8XIK].
229. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 25, at 1200.
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the agencies to abide by their APA and cost-benefit requirements, then the
courts can and should intervene.230
Nor would judicial oversight prevent, or even hinder, other government
bodies from helping agencies coordinate their rules. If FSOC or OIRA can suc-
ceed in fostering collaboration between the SEC and CFTC, they would there-
by succeed in helping the financial regulators satisfy their APA and cost-benefit
mandates. But insofar as FSOC and OIRA do not effectively prompt interagen-
cy coordination, the judiciary has a role to play in enforcing the reason-giving
requirement. To reiterate, judges would not order agencies to adopt a certain
rule or regulatory approach -they would simply ensure that agencies provide
public justifications for promulgating inconsistent regulations.
Freeman and Rossi also incorrectly assume that the courts should not play a
role in resolving disputes between different regulators. In fact, Rossi and Free-
man conceive of judicial review as a possible obstacle for agency coordination
because insufficient deference might stymie executive efforts to get regulators
to work together.2 31 As I argued in the previous Section, this vision of the judi-
ciary misrepresents judges role in administrative law. Under my proposal, the
courts would not tell agencies how to act. Rather, they would use cost-benefit
requirements and the APA to enforce the reason-giving requirement in seminal
cases like Overton Park232 and State Farm.233 Note that this form of judicial ac-
tion would empower agencies by allowing them to decide for themselves how
to work together. Whereas legislative or executive supervision involves an au-
thority telling agencies how to act, the judicial scrutiny required by cost-benefit
analysis and the APA would preserve agencies' discretion to decide the most
effective way to collaborate.
Forcing agencies to consider the effects of regulatory divergences also pre-
serves some of the beneficial effects of overlapping regulatory oversight. Martin
Landau has argued that it is often desirable for multiple regulators to oversee
the same products.234 Landau defends overlapping regulations because they
create a bias toward overprotection. Because multiple regulators often oversee
the same financial instrument, duplicative regulations can check bad behavior
230. See supra Part II.
231. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 25, at 1137.
232. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
233. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
234. See Martin Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap, 29
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346 (1969) (defending redundancy in public administration); see also Eric
Biber, Too Many Things To Do: How To Deal with the Dysfunctions ofMultiple-Goal Agencies, 33
HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2009) (arguing that multiple-goal agencies can be monitored




by establishing backstops that protect against regulatory failures.235 The type
of judicial review I envision is fully compatible with justifiable regulatory di-
vergences. In requiring agencies to justify inconsistent regulations, I do not ar-
gue that agencies could never enact divergent regulations. But when regulated
parties criticize a regulatory divergence, the agency must provide a reasoned
justification for the difference. And of course, the judiciary would not be per-
mitted to consolidate multiple agencies or otherwise force formal collaboration.
The proposal here is far narrower. It would not compromise the benefits of
having multiple perspectives when those benefits are justifiable.
Judicial review of regulatory divergences is also compatible with the views
of scholars who defend regulatory fragmentation in certain cases for promoting
administrative experimentation. According to some scholars, redundant over-
sight is desirable because it allows agencies to test different regulatory ap-
proaches and encourages agencies to function like laboratories, devising origi-
nal solutions to difficult administrative challenges.236 For example, Neal Katyal
has argued that the overlapping antitrust authority of the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the Department of Justice can be justified on these grounds.2 37
Similarly, judicial review need not preclude financial regulators from crafting
creative solutions to regulating the swaps market. Agencies are required to jus-
tify regulatory differences and to defend new approaches with sound logic.
Whereas consolidating or eliminating agency functions might deter interagen-
cy "competition" and prevent agencies from becoming "laboratories" for crea-
tive policy solutions,238 coordinating agency action through judicial review
could preserve agency independence while channeling competition in produc-
tive ways. It may even prompt agencies to offer public reasons for decisions
that use novel approaches.
Perhaps the most challenging critique is that my prescriptive view could
contribute to rulemaking "ossification." Ossification refers to the fact that
searching judicial review has occasionally prevented agencies from engaging in
meaningful policymaking. Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst, for example, have
shown that the judiciary's willingness to remand rules promulgated by NHTSA
pushed the agency away from rulemaking and into "case-by-case adjudication,
235. Note that although this critique applies to many agencies that oversee a product, this cri-
tique does not apply directly to swaps. As I explain in Part I, the SEC regulates certain types
of swaps, and the CFTC regulates other kinds of swaps. Thus, the SEC would never estab-
lish additional checks on CFTC-regulated swaps.
236. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch
from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2325 (20o6).
237. Id.
238. See id.
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which requires little, if any, technological sophistication and which has no
known effects on vehicle safety."239 According to Mashaw and Harfst, judicial
scrutiny that required NHTSA to justify safety rules with reasons led the agen-
cy to abandon rulemaking in favor of a less effective alternative- recalling au-
tomobiles after cars were found hazardous.
It is conceivable that my proposal would give courts further ammunition to
invalidate agency actions. However, scholars have generally responded to the
problems of agency ossification not by recommending the elimination of the
reason-giving requirement, but by suggesting modifications to accommodate
the realities of agency policymaking. Justice Elena Kagan and Professor
Kathryn Watts, for example, have argued that permitting agencies to appeal to
certain political reasons would de-ossify rulemaking by giving agencies addi-
tional ways to justify new rules.240 Others have supported relaxing the technical
requirements of rulemaking without getting rid of the reason-giving require-
ment.24 1 Moreover, the alternative to a reason-giving requirement is adminis-
trative rulemaking without judicial review. This is because, unless agencies
provide reasons, courts will have no basis upon which to police agency discre-
tion. Thus, critics who fear ossification generally advocate not abolishing the
APA's reason-giving requirements, but rather adapting the reason-giving re-
quirement by weakening or otherwise modifying the standard of judicial re-
view so that courts can supervise administrative action without undermining
administrative efficiency.24 2
239. JERRY L. MASHAw & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 147-71 (1990).
240. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2246, 2382-83 (2001) (arguing
that permitting politics to play a role in hard look review would help to respond to the ossi-
fication charge often levied against hard look review because "courts would have an addi-
tional reason to defer to administrative decisions in which the President has played a role,'
and hence courts would reverse agency decisions less often); Watts, supra note 151.
241. Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE L.J.
1385, 1401 (1992) (attributing the "Herculean effort of assembling the record and drafting a
preamble" to heightened judicial scrutiny of rulemaking); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways
To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65 (1997) (suggesting that the strin-
gent judicial gloss on the APA has "transform[ed] the simple, efficient notice-and-comment
process into an extraordinarily lengthy, complicated, and expensive process," discouraging
agency use of rulemaking).
242. Note that there may still be congressional and presidential oversight, but such oversight is
often opaque. In a 2014 report on cost-benefit analysis, the GAO found that in seventy-two
percent of cases, OIRA gave no explanation for designating a rule as significant. See Federal
Rulemaking: Opportunities Remain for OMB To Improve the Transparency of Rulemaking Pro-
cesses: Testimony Before the H. Subcomm. on Gov't Operations of the Comm. on Oversight & Gov't





Of course, this model of judicial review is not a panacea. One possible
problem is that the SEC and CFTC could manipulate their cost-benefit anal-
yses to promote their own agendas.243 But judicial review is unlikely to aggra-
vate the general problem of agency inconsistencies or false justifications. In-
stead, it promises at worst a partial solution. At present, the SEC and CFTC
have barely considered the costs of inconsistent swaps regulations. This lack of
oversight has left the agencies free to pursue their own agendas. Justifying in-
consistencies would at least make them consider the costs of those inconsisten-
cies. If the agencies thought that such justifications were unjustifiably costly,
they might choose to avoid the headache of defending their inconsistencies and
promulgate consistent regulations. And since the alternative could be a world
with few corrective options and no oversight, the possibility of an imperfect so-
lution is preferable to no solution at all.
C. Models for SEC and CFTC Swap Harmonization
The previous Section showed that judges would not substitute their judg-
ment for that of the regulators, but would instead allow the agencies to choose
for themselves how to collaborate most effectively. This Section describes how
regulators in other arenas have found creative ways to work together to reduce
the burdens of overlapping and duplicative regulations. If the SEC or CFTC
determined that divergent swaps regulations were unjustifiable, the agencies
could follow any one of several regulatory harmonization models.
One approach that the SEC and CFTC could choose is "substituted compli-
ance,"244 which they have done in the past when issuing commodities regula-
tions. Substituted compliance occurs when compliance with one agency's rules
constitutes compliance with the other's.24 5 For example, in 2013, the CFTC ex-
plained that commodity pool operators that had registered with the SEC would
not have to register with the CFTC because the two agencies' regimes were de-
signed "to achieve substantially similar goals."246 The CFTC emphasized that it
approved this "substituted compliance" approach because it felt "that general
243. Cf Robert Haveman, The Chicago O'Hare Expansion: A Case Study ofAdministrative Manipu-
lation ofBenefit-Cost Principles, 23 REs. L. & ECON. 183, 184-86 (2007) (describing the FAA's
use of cost-benefit analysis to justify its preexisting agenda).
244. See Harmonization of Compliance Obligations for Registered Investment Companies Re-
quired To Register as Commodity Pool Operators, 78 Fed. Reg. 52,308, 52,308-10 (Aug. 22,
2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R. Pt. 4) (allowing certain commodities companies already regis-
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reliance upon the SEC's compliance regime ... should provide market partici-
pants and the general public with meaningful disclosure."2 4 7 The CFTC thus
adopted the very approach that MarketAxess suggested in order to harmonize
SEF registration requirements. 248 The CFTC has also used this method to
harmonize its swap clearing rules with international regulators. For example, in
February 2016, the CFTC recognized that the European regulators' rules were
functionally equivalent to its own and declared that market participants could
satisfy Title VII's clearing requirements by using international clearing corpora-
tions.24 9
Agencies can engage in substituted compliance formally through rulemak-
ing, or informally through Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). A promi-
nent example of this form of collaboration is the "horizontal merger" guide-
lines that the DOJ and FTC released in 2010. The guidelines explain how the
two agencies will evaluate the competitive impact of mergers under federal an-
titrust law.25 0 The guidelines were the result of a proactive effort to avoid in-
compatible antitrust enforcement actions. Freeman and Rossi praised the
guidelines for transparently "signal [ing] the agencies' current thinking regard-
ing enforcement policy and alert[ing] the regulated community to what types
of mergers will attract the most scrutiny."251
Under substituted compliance, the SEC, which has typically issued new
swaps regulations after the CFTC, could permit companies to comply with on-
ly the CFTC's registration rules. The SEC could also modify its rules governing
the establishment and maintenance of SEFs to allow compliance with CFTC
rules to satisfy SEC SEF regulations. The SEC would simply state that partici-
pants that trade security-based swaps on SEFs effectively comply with its regu-
lations if the participants follow the CFTC's rules.
Agencies have also enacted rules jointly,25 2 as the SEC and CFTC did when
defining the terms "swap" and "security-based swap."253 Agencies have even
247. Id. at 52,310.
248. See supra Section I.B.
249. Ed Beeson, CFTC, Europe Hatch Accord on Clearing Rules, ILAw36o (Feb. io, 2016, 9:41 AM),
http://www.law36o.com/securities/articles/757561 [http://perma.cc/FZ4U-5BZU].
250. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. DEP'T JUST. & U.S. FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Aug.
19, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/loo8l9hmg
.pdf [http://perma.cc/GCU5-B46B].
251. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 25, at 1165.
252. The financial industry has seen the most joint rules. See, e.g., Definitions Contained in Title
VII of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 51,429,
51,429 (Aug. 20, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 240); Community Reinvestment Act




authorized a single agency to write a rule that they all agree to enforce.254 Such
approaches would clearly reduce the problem of inconsistent swaps regula-
tions. If the SEC and CFTC issued rules together, or if one agency agreed that
it would adopt the other agency's rules, then regulated parties would be re-
quired to follow only one set of swaps rules.
" [D] efault position requirements" 255 and "concurrence requirements" 25 6 are
two other options. Default position requirements occur when "Con-
gress . . . mak[es] adherence to the interested agency's suggestions the default
position from which the action agency may deviate only by showing that ad-
herence to such suggestions would interfere with the action agency's legal du-
ties. 25 7 Concurrence requirements occur when Congress authorizes one agency
to set a baseline regulatory standard from which another agency must not devi-
ate; they essentially constrain the scope of the latter agency's decisions in cer-
tain domains.258
C.F.R. pts. 25, 228, 345, 563e) (issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking for the joint revision
of rules by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve Board, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Office of Thrift Supervision to implement the Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act); Prohibition on Funding of Unlawful Internet Gambling, 73 Fed.
Reg. 69,382, 69,405 (Nov. 18, 2008) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 233, 31 C.F.R. pt. 132) (prom-
ulgating joint rules of the FRB and the Department of the Treasury to implement the Un-
lawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 20o6, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-67 (2012)); Risk-
Based Capital Standards; Recourse and Direct Credit Substitutes, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,944,
59,944 (Nov. 5, 1997) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 305, 325, 567). The regulated
community in the financial sector has tended to support joint rulemaking because of its po-
tential to increase uniformity. See, e.g., Letter from Floyd E. Stoner, Exec. Editor, Am. Bank-
ers Ass'n, to Barney Frank, Chairman, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., and Spencer Bac-
hus, Ranking Member, House Comm. on Fin. Servs. (Sept. 18, 2007), http://www.aba
.com/archive/LettersCongress Archive/Letters%2oto%2oCongress%2oArchive/FHA-ABA
LetterSenateo918o7.pdf [http://perma.cc/FZ95-64S5] ("Joint rulemaking is important to
ensure uniformity of regulation for all insured depository institutions.").
253. See sources cited supra note 61.
254. This is precisely what the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration, and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration do.
These agencies have authorized Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to
promulgate rules on behalf of all three agencies.
255. For a fuller discussion of these requirements, see Freeman & Rossi, supra note 25, at 1159.
256. Id. at 116o.
257. Id. at 1159.
258. For example, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,101-270 (2012), grants authority
to the EPA to promulgate environmental standards regulating releases of radioactive materi-
als in nuclear waste repositories and requires that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's re-
pository-licensing decisions "not be inconsistent" with those standards. Id. § 10,141(a),
(b)(1)(C).
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Note that Investment Co. Institute, which held that the CFTC did not have to
consider the possibility that a future rule might undermine the effectiveness of
its own rule, suggests that the first regulator may create an implicit default po-
sition requirement by declaring that an agency need not consider how future
rules might affect its own rule. Because the CFTC promulgated its reporting
rules and its SEF rules before the SEC did, it need not explain why its rule di-
verged from the SEC's. A corollary of my argument is therefore that when one
agency enacts a rule before the other agency, as the CFTC has done in promul-
gating swaps rules, that agency creates a default position from which the sec-
ond agency can diverge only if it gives a reasoned justification for doing so. Of
course, the SEC would not be required to adopt and enforce the same regula-
tion as the CFTC - as agencies subject to congressionally mandated default po-
sition requirements must. The SEC would, however, have to show that its di-
vergences from the CFTC's rules are justified, and the APA and cost-benefit
requirements would effectively circumscribe the possible regulations the SEC
can adopt.2 5 9
As these examples demonstrate, agencies can harmonize regulations in var-
ious ways. And although many of these approaches result from congressional
or executive mandates, they model how the SEC and CFTC could satisfy APA
and cost-benefit requirements after judicial review. As the preceding analysis of
swaps regulations has shown, the alternative may not only be undesirable, but
also illegal.
CONCLUSION
In his State of the Union Address in 2011, President Barack Obama publicly
acknowledged the problem of overlapping regulation:
There are 12 different agencies that deal with exports. There are at least
five different agencies that deal with housing policy. Then there's my
favorite example: the Interior Department is in charge of salmon while
they're in fresh water, but the Commerce Department handles them
259. One may argue that pressure to be the first to regulate creates an undesirable pressure to
regulate quickly and therefore poorly. My response to this argument is that haste may not in
this case make waste. The regulators would still be subject to judicial scrutiny, and so they
could not pass arbitrary regulations. Further, agencies would still be subject to traditional
non-judicial checks and balances that hold them accountable. Agency heads still have to ap-
pear before Congress and subject new rules to OIRA review. Thus, the pressure to regulate
first may push agencies to regulate more efficiently, and because a number of checks exist to





when they're in saltwater. I hear it gets even more complicated once
they're smoked.26 0
In the current regulatory climate, swaps and salmon suffer a common fate.
As the Comptroller General of the United States has stated, "Virtually all of the
results that the federal government strives to achieve require the concerted and
coordinated efforts of two or more agencies."261 Three twenty-first century
events-the U.S. government's failure to prevent the terrorist attacks on Sep-
tember 11, 2001, the Bush Administration's response to the devastation caused
by Hurricane Katrina in 20o5, and the Obama Administration's response to the
BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010-have drawn attention to the pressing
need for greater coordination among our administrative agencies.262 Scholars
have also criticized agencies' failure to coordinate as causing broader policy
failures such as energy shortages.2 63 Although some have been pessimistic
about courts' abilities to encourage cooperation that would minimize the costs
of regulatory inconsistencies, these academics have failed to account for the fact
that the ordinary tools of judicial review can be used to force agencies to con-
sider the ways that their actions interact. But courts can - and should - play an
important role in fostering interagency coordination when the other branches
fail.
260. President Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President in State of Union Address (Jan.
25, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/ol/25/remarks-president-state
-union-address [http://perma.cc/A47Z-ST27].
261. Managing for Results: Using GPRA To Help Congressional Decisionmaking and Strengthen Over-
sight: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Rules and Org. of the H., Comm. on Rules, 1o6th Cong.
19 (2000) (statement of David M. Walker, U.S. Comptroller Gen.), http://www
.gao.gov/assets/110/108330.pdf [http://perma.cc/8QFS-5EFU].
262. See, e.g., Michael N. Widener, Bridging the Gulf Using Mediated, Consensus-Based Regulation
To Reconcile Competing Public Policy Agendas in Disaster Mitigation, 74 ALB. L. REV. 587, 598-
99 (2011); The 9/11 Commission Report, NAT'L COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON
UNITED STATES 400-03 (2004), http://www.911commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3HY8-Q8S58]; Frances Fragos Townsend et al., The Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, DEP'T HOMELAND SECURITY & COUNTERTERRORISM 52-
55 (20o6), http://library.stmarytx.edu/acadlib/edocs/katrinawh.pdf [http://perma.cc/UV52
-UZW41.
263. See Peter Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory Authority, loo HARv.
L. REV. 1002, 1002-03 (1987).
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